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I. INTRODUCTION
After a jury trial in Pennsylvania in 1986, Roland William Steele, an
African-American man, was convicted of three counts of first-degree
murder and related charges based upon his alleged killings of three
Caucasian women.' In 1996, he unsuccessfully filed a Post-Conviction
Relief Act (PCRA) petition, in which he claimed, inter alia, "that his due
process rights and right to a fair and impartial jury were violated by the
racial prejudice of one of the jurors."2 The basis for Steele's petition, which
the PCRA court deemed inadmissible, was the declaration of a juror, "who
stated that race was an issue from the inception of the trial. The juror stated
in his declaration that 'early in the trial one of the other jurors commented
on the race of the defendant."' 3 According to the declaration, the racist
juror "'also noted the race of three victims and stated that, on that basis
alone, the defendant was probably guilty. "'A The juror additionally alleged
that the racist juror's "'comments continued at other breaks and he made
very racist remarks. First one juror, then two or three more gradually
became drawn to his position as the first week wore on."' 5 Finally, the
declaration asserted that the racist juror said during trial that Steele should
"'fry, get the chair or be hung. "
6
Devastatingly, the racist juror's death wish will likely come true
because Steele was given three separate death sentences. 7 In 2008, Steele's
appeal from the PCRA court's ruling finally reached the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, which found in Commonwealth v. Steele that it could not
consider the juror's declaration. 8 The court noted that under Pennsylvania
Rule of Evidence 606(b):
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict,.., a juror
may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring
Commonwealth v. Steele, 961 A.2d 786, 792-93 (Pa. 2008).
'Id. at 807.
31d. at 792, 807.
41d. at 807.
51id.
61d. at 807-08.
7Id. at 792.
8Id. at 808.
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during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect
of anything upon that or any other juror's mind or emotions
in reaching a decision upon the verdict or concerning the
juror's mental processes in connection therewith, and a
juror's affidavit or evidence of any statement by the juror
about any of these subjects may not be received. However,
a juror may testify concerning whether prejudicial facts not
of record, and beyond common knowledge and experience,
were improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether
any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon
any juror.9
According to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, this Rule precluded
the admission of the juror's declaration because its exceptions apply only to
"outside influences, not statements made by the jurors themselves. '"1 The
court's opinion was consistent with prior Pennsylvania precedent. " Earlier
in 2008, a lower Pennsylvania court denied the PCRA petition of an
African-American man convicted of first-degree murder, applying Rule
606(b) to preclude the admission of a juror's post-trial allegation that
multiple jurors used racial slurs "early and often" during trial.1 2  The
opinion was also consistent with the vast majority of state and federal
precedent from across the country. 3 Rules similar to Pennsylvania Rule of
Evidence 606(b) have "repeatedly been held to preclude a juror from
testifying, in support of a motion for a new trial, that juror conduct during
deliberations suggests the verdict was tainted by racial bias."' 14 Moreover,
while such cases arise with much less frequency, courts consistently have
found that Rule 606(b) precludes jurors from testifying after trial about
91d. (quoting PA. R. EvID. 606(b)).
'°Steele, 961 A.2d at 808 (emphasis in original); see also Posting of Colin Miller to
Evidence Profflog, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/evidenceprof/2008/12/606b-com-v-
stee.html (Dec. 19, 2008).
" See Steele, 961 A.2d at 808.
12See Posting of Colin Miller to Evidence ProfBlog,
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/evidenceprof/2008/03/racial-bias-pa.html (Mar. 22, 2008).
13See Victor Gold, Juror Competency to Testify that a Verdict Was the Product of Racial
Bias, 9 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 125, 126 (1993); see also Developments in the Law -
Racist Juror Misconduct During Deliberations, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1595, 1597 (1988)
[hereinafter Racist Juror Misconduct] ("[F]ew courts have admitted juror testimony of racist jury
misconduct .... ).
14 See Gold, supra note 13, at 126 and accompanying text.
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religious15 or ethnic' 6 slurs used by jurors during trial.
While addressing a case with somewhat similar facts, the Ninth Circuit
in United States v. Henley was able to reach a very different result.' 7 In
Henley, a jury convicted four men on two charges of possession with intent
to distribute cocaine, and three of the four men were African-American.
18
After they were convicted, the men moved for a new trial, claiming, inter
alia, that juror Sean O'Reilly made "several racist remarks" during trial,
perhaps including statements such as, "All the n[******] should hang" and
"The n[******] are guilty."' 9  These statements would have surprised
anyone who read O'Reilly's responses to his voir dire questionnaire, in
which he averred that "his overall view of interracial dating was 'neutral,'
that he had never had a bad experience with a person of a different race, and
that race would not influence his decision as a juror in any way. '20 The
Ninth Circuit was able to consider O'Reilly's alleged statements in Henley
when addressing the appellants' motion, concluding that, "[w]here, as here,
a juror has been asked direct questions about racial bias during voir dire,
and has sworn that racial bias would play no part in his deliberations,
evidence of that juror's alleged racial bias is indisputably admissible for the
purpose of determining whether the juror's responses were truthful." 2'
The Ninth Circuit was not being hyperbolic. In reaching a similar
conclusion in its 2008 opinion in State v. Hidanovic, the Supreme Court of
North Dakota noted that "[c]ourts have universally held that provisions
15See, e.g., Marcavage v. Bd. of Trs. of Temple Univ., 400 F. Supp. 2d 801, 806 (E.D. Pa.
2005) ("Plaintiff's assertions that Juror No. 11 was 'verbally attacked' by other jurors because of
his religious beliefs and was accused of bias in favor of Plaintiff because of those beliefs fall
squarely within juror harassment and intimidation and are prohibited by Rule 606(b).").
16See, e.g., Tabchi v. Duchodni, 56 Pa. D. & C.4th 238, 250 (C.P. 2002) ("Plaintiffs'
contention that the jury was influenced by anti-Arab bias and bigotry in the course of its
deliberations is based solely upon the allegations of other jurors.").
"
7238 F.3d 1111, 1112 (9th Cir. 2001).
" ld. at 1111-12, 1119.
91d. at 1113-14. Sean O'Reilly was not the only juror who allegedly committed misconduct,
nor was the alleged misconduct limited to the jurors. Defendant Darryl Henley, a football player
with the Rams, allegedly promised juror Michael Malachowski a job with the Rams in exchange
for Malachowski "'do[ing] anything it takes' to secure a not guilty vote." Id. at 1111-12.
20 Id. at 1121.
2 11d. The Ninth Circuit flirted with the idea that Rule 606(b) might not prevent jurors from
impeaching their verdicts through allegations of racial or other bias but found that it did not need
to resolve this issue in light of the fact that it could admit the allegations to determine whether
O'Reilly lied during voir dire. See id. at 1121.
[Vol. 61:3
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similar to N.D.R.Ev. 606(b) ... do not preclude evidence to show a juror
lied during voir dire., 22 The reason for this distinction between Henley and
Steele, where jurors were not asked about racial prejudice before trial, is
that "rule 606(b) restricts inquiries into the validity of a jury's verdict but it
does not bar inquiries into whether a juror lied or purposely withheld
information during voir dire. 23 While these courts are technically correct
that such inquiries are directed toward the issue of whether a juror lied on
voir dire and not the (in)validity of the verdict, the distinction is frequently
ephemeral. Quoting the Supreme Court's opinion in McDonough Power
Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, the Ninth Circuit aptly concluded in Henley
that "[i]f appellants can show that a juror 'failed to answer honestly a
material question on voir dire, and then further show that a correct response
would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause,' then they are
entitled to a new trial.",24 Because "[d]emonstrated bias in the responses to
questions on voir dire may result in a juror being excused for cause," it is
easy to see how quickly the distinction can collapse.25
This being the case, how can judges continue to preclude appellants
from presenting evidence of juror racial, religious, or other bias, based
solely on the fact that their attorneys did not anticipate that their trials
would be resolved with reference to factors such as skin color or choice of
deity?2 6 How can Rule 606(b) deem jurors per se incompetent to impeach
their verdicts on the ground of bias based at least in part upon concerns
about reliability when, as will be seen infra, courts have eliminated all other
reliability-based competency rules in criminal cases? 27 And how can they
do so when it is the appellant's freedom, and often his life, that is at stake,
rather than simply a private injury?
The answer can be found in two parts. First, courts generally conclude
that they are prohibited by the strict language of Rule 606(b) from
considering such allegations, despite being uncomfortable with the results
22747 N.W.2d 463, 474 (N.D. 2008).
23 Manrique v. State, 177 P.3d 1188, 1191 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008).
24Henley, 238 F.3d at 1121 (quoting McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S.
548, 556 (1984)).
25 Greenwood, 464 U.S. at 554.
26 See, e.g., Hidanovich, 747 N.W.2d at 474 (noting that allegations of juror bias are
admissible to prove that a juror lied during voir dire but inadmissible as part of an inquiry into the
validity of a verdict).
27See infra notes 432-46 and accompanying text.
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that the Rule produces. 28 For instance, in its 2008 opinion in People v.
Brooks, the Court of Appeals of Michigan denied Keith Brooks' motion for
a new trial after finding that it was precluded from considering the affidavit
of the jury foreman, who, like Brooks, was African-American. 29 According
to that foreman, a juror claimed that the foreman's position that Brooks was
not guilty was a "brotherhood thing," which immediately prompted another
juror to "introduce[] race into the discussion." 30 But while the foreman
eventually relented in his not guilty vote, the court stood firm in its
application of Rule 606(b); despite characterizing this alleged misconduct
as "disturbing," it found itself duty-bound to preclude the affidavit because
it did not allege an "extraneous influence.",
3
'
Second, courts faced with constitutional challenges to such applications
of Rule 606(b) generally have rejected them based upon Tanner v. United
States, where the Supreme Court found that applying Rule 606(b) to
preclude jury impeachment concerning jurors drinking alcohol, using and
selling drugs, and falling asleep during trial did not violate the petitioners'
Sixth Amendment right to a competent jury.32  Most courts have
extrapolated from Tanner that applying Rule 606(b) to preclude jury
impeachment concerning jurors using racial, religious, or other slurs
similarly does not violate the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury.33
As an example, in Shillcutt v. Gagnon, the Seventh Circuit denied an
African-American appellant's petition for writ of habeas corpus from the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin's opinion denying his motion for a new trial
after he was convicted of soliciting prostitutes and keeping a place of
prostitution.34 The state supreme court denied that motion after refusing
under its version of Rule 606(b) to consider the affidavit of a juror who
claimed that one of the jurors had commented, "Let's be logical, he's a
black, and he sees a seventeen year old white girl-I know the type." 35 The
28See, e.g., People v. Brooks, No. 281489, 2008 WL 2855040, at *2-3 (Mich. Ct. App. July
24, 2008).
291d. at 1-2.
30Id. at *1.
311d. at *3.
32483 U.S. 107, 113-15, 126-27 (1987).
33See Racist Juror Misconduct, supra note 13, at 1596 ("The Supreme Court's recent
decision in Tanner v. United States seems to insulate rule 606(b) from constitutional attack.").
14827 F.2d 1155, 1159-60 (7th Cir. 1987).
31State v. Shillcutt, 350 N.W.2d 686, 688-90 (Wis. 1984). In finding that this statement did
not constitute extraneous prejudicial information, the court concluded:
[Vol. 61:3
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Seventh Circuit thereafter denied the appellant's petition, citing Tanner for
the proposition that the exchange of ideas during jury deliberations,
"however crude or learned, is important enough to preserve" to preclude
peering behind the jury room curtain.36
Convicted criminal defendants, however, should be able to rely upon
another Sixth Amendment right to allow them to present post-trial juror
testimony regarding racial, religious, or other bias by jurors. Since its
1967 opinion in Washington v. Texas, the Supreme Court has declared that
the Compulsory Process Clause renders unto criminal defendants the "right
to present a defense,, 38 and courts have broadly defined that right as the
right to present evidence, whether at an initial trial, at a direct appeal, or in
support of a motion for a new trial or petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
39
On six (out of seven) occasions, the Supreme Court found that courts
violated this right by applying rules of evidence in a manner that was
arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes that they were designed to
serve.
40
This article argues that when courts preclude jurors from impeaching
their verdicts through evidence of juror racial, religious, or other bias, they
apply Rule 606(b) in a way that is arbitrary and disproportionate to the
purposes that the Rule is designed to serve and thus violate criminal
defendants' rights to present a defense. Section II traces the common law
history of Rule 606(b) from the English Mansfield's Rule to the American
Iowa Rule and the Supreme Court's futile attempts at clarification. This
Section pays particular attention to the debate over the enactment of Federal
Rule of Evidence 606(b), the Constitutional challenge to it in Tanner v.
United States, and courts' application of the Rule to preclude post-trial jury
'[E]xtraneous prejudicial information' is knowledge coming from the outside which is
prejudicial. The juror in this case stated: 'Let's be logical, he's a black, and he sees a
seventeen year old white girl-I know the type.' The juror did not explain what 'type'
he had in mind. Whatever factual content the other jurors gave to this statement had to
be supplied from their own catalogue of 'types' rather than from the statement itself.
The juror's statement here does not fall under the category of extraneous prejudicial
information.
Id. at 690.
36 Gagnon, 827 F.2d at 1159.
37See, e.g., Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967).
381d.
39 See infra notes 375-77 and accompanying text.
'See infra Part III.A.2-8.
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testimony regarding jurors' use of racial, religious, or other slurs during
trial.
Section III tracks the Supreme Court's development of the right to
present a defense-from its creation of the right in Washington v. Texas, to
its last word on the right in Holmes v. South Carolina, a unanimous opinion
delivered by Justice Alito in 2006. This Section notes that despite courts
reading the right broadly as the right to present evidence, no defendant has
yet attempted to claim that the exclusion of evidence of juror misconduct
violates the right, and only one court, the Third Circuit, in an opinion
written by then Judge Alito, has addressed the issue.
Section IV argues that the application of Rule 606(b) to exclude
allegations of racial, religious or other bias by jurors violates the right to
present a defense in three ways. First, Rule 606(b) is a rule of
(in)competency based in part on the presumed unreliability of jurors
seeking to impeach their verdicts, and the Court in Washington v. Texas
found that such rules violate the right to present a defense. Second, the
Court in Washington v. Texas found that rules that do not rationally set
apart a group of persons particularly likely to commit perjury violate the
right, and courts irrationally preclude some jurors from impeaching their
verdicts based upon allegations of juror bias under Rule 606(b) while
permitting other jurors to testify regarding similar allegations to prove that
they or other jurors lied during voir dire. Third, the Court in Rock v.
Arkansas found that rules that per se exclude "unreliable" evidence violate
the right when that evidence may be reliable in an individual case, and
allegations of juror bias can be proven to be reliable in individual cases.
II. THE PROSCRIPTION ON POST-TRIAL JURY IMPEACHMENT OF
VERDICTS
A. The Common Law History of the Anti-Jury Impeachment Rule
1. Mansfield's Rule
Prior to 1785, English courts "sometimes received" post-trial juror
testimony and affidavits concerning juror misconduct, "though always with
great caution.",41 In that year, English Chief Justice Lord Mansfield decided
Vaise v. Delaval, where he was confronted with post-trial affidavits by
41 McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 268 (1915).
880 [Vol. 61:3
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jurors indicating that "the jury being divided in their opinion, had tossed
,,42 sle h
up, i.e., resolved the case by "flipping a coin or some other method of
chance determination. 43 Mansfield deemed the affidavits inadmissible by
applying the then-popular Latin maxim, nemo turpitudinem suam allegans
audietur (a "witness shall not be heard to allege his own turpitude").4
According to Mansfield, jurors were not competent to impeach their own
verdicts, and thus themselves, because "a person testifying to his own
wrongdoing was, by definition, an unreliable witness. ' Vaise thus became
the basis for "Mansfield's Rule," "a blanket ban on jurors testifying against
their own verdict, 46 although, according to Mansfield, post-trial testimony
concerning jury misconduct could be admissible if it came from another
source, "such as from some person having seen the [deliberations] through
a window, or by some such other means. 47
2. The Iowa Rule
Based upon "the prestige of the great Chief Justice, [Mansfield's Rule]
soon prevailed in England, and its authority came to receive in this country
an adherence almost unquestioned" 48 until the latter half of the nineteenth
century. 49 The first major crack in the dam appeared in the 1851 opinion in
United States v. Reid, where the United States Supreme Court refused to
permit jurors to impeach their verdict convicting the defendants of murder
based upon evidence that an ostensibly non-influential newspaper account
of the case found its way into the deliberation room.50 In dicta, however,
the Court mused that "cases might arise in which it would be impossible to
refuse Uuror affidavits] without violating the plainest principles of
justice. 51  The floodgates then opened fifteen years later in Wright v.
Illinois & Mississippi Telegraph Co., when the Supreme Court of Iowa
4299 Eng. Rep. 944, 944 (K.B. 1785).
43 David A. Christman, Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) and the Problem of 'Differential'
Jury Error, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 802, 815 n.76 (1992).
441d. at 815 & n.78.
41Id. at 815 n.78.
46United States v. Benally, 546 F.3d 1230, 1233 (10th Cir. 2008).
47 Vaise, 99 Eng. Rep. at 944.
485 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE
IN TRIAL AT COMMON LAW § 2352 (2d ed. 1923).
49 Christman, supra note 43, at 816.
5053 U.S. (12 How.) 361, 361-62, 366 (1851).
" Id. at 366.
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reviewed an Iowa trial court's refusal to consider four juror affidavits
alleging an illegal quotient verdict, i.e., that their "verdict was determined
by each juror marking down such sum as he thought fit, and dividing the
aggregate by twelve and taking the quotient as their verdict. 52  The
Supreme Court of Iowa deemed the trial court's refusal reversible error,
concluding that courts could receive juror affidavits for purposes such as
proving "that the verdict was determined by aggregation and average, or by
lot, or game of chance, or other artifice or improper manner."53
This was exactly the direct repost to Mansfield's Rule that it appeared to
be, with the court deeming the Rule "not more than satisfactory. 54 The
Supreme Court of Iowa acknowledged that jurors reaching a verdict by
"resort to lot or the like" was "illegal and reprehensible," but it found that
"such resort might not evince more turpitude tending to the discredit of [a
juror's] statement than would be evinced by a person not of the jury, in the
espionage indicated by Lord Mansfield. '' 55 Indeed, the court noted that
jurors would be in a superior position to impeach their own verdicts than
Mansfield's eavesdroppers based upon their "superior opportunities of
knowledge and less liability to mistake. 56 Finally, the court concluded that
if the proposed jury impeachment concerned merely "the fact of improper
practice, .... there [wa]s no reason why a court should close its ears to the
evidence of it from one class of persons, while it will hear it from another
class, which stands in no more enviable light and is certainly no more
entitled to credit.,
57
3. Post-Iowa Rule Variations
After Wright's creation of the .'Iowa Rule,' as it came to be known,
new formulations of and variations on the Mansfield rule were created by
state courts. 58 For instance, in its 1871 opinion in Woodward v. Leavitt,
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts addressed the question of
whether a court properly admitted two types of post-trial juror testimony
during consideration of the plaintiffs motion for a new trial: (1) testimony
5220 Iowa 195, 212 (1866).
"3Id. at 195.
541d. at 211.
55Id.
"Id. at 211-12.
171d. at 212.
58 Christman, supra note 43, at 817.
[Vol. 61:3
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by juror Solomon Brown that he may have formed and expressed an
opinion on the merits of the case before being seated; and (2) testimony by
other jurors that Brown did not take part in deliberations and by Brown
himself that he "did not vote against the plaintiff till after all the other jurors
had."59 The court found that the first type of testimony was admissible
because it did "not concern[] anything that passed in the jury room;"
however, it found that the second type of testimony was improperly
admitted because "it related to the private deliberations of the jury ....
Meanwhile, in its 1874 opinion in Perry v. Bailey, the Supreme Court of
Kansas permitted the admission of juror affidavits indicating, inter alia, that
another juror drank alcohol during a recess and was abusive during
deliberations.6' In so doing, the court drew a dichotomy between
unacceptable jury impeachment regarding matters resting in the personal
consciousness of one juror and acceptable jury impeachment regarding
overt acts, "open to the knowledge of all the jury. 62 According to the
court, jury impeachment on the former subject would give "the secret
thought of one the power to disturb the expressed conclusions of twelve,"
while overt acts are "accessible to the knowledge of all the jurors. If one
affirms misconduct, the remaining eleven can deny; one cannot disturb the
action of the twelve; it is useless to tamper with one, for the eleven may be
heard.
6 3
4. The Supreme Court's Attempts at Clarification
Possibly mindful of the post- Wright variations on Mansfield's Rule, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Mattox v. United States, a murder
appeal in which Clyde Mattox alleged that the trial court erred by failing to
consider juror affidavits indicating that: (1) a newspaper article injurious to
Mattox was read to the jury, and (2) the bailiff informed the jury that "this
was the third person Clyde Mattox had killed. ' 64 In its 1892 opinion
written by Chief Justice Fuller, the Court began by citing the
aforementioned dicta from Reid and setting forth the holdings in Bailey and
59107 Mass. 453, 459 (1871).
60Id. at 471.
6112 Kan. 539, 542-43 (1874).
62 1d. at 545.
6 3 1d.
64 146 U.S. 140, 150-51 (1892).
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Leavitt.65  Justice Fuller found that these opinions laid down a rule
"conformable to right reason and sustained by the weight of authority":
"[p]rivate communications, possibly prejudicial, between jurors and third
persons, or witnesses, or the officer in charge, are absolutely forbidden, and
invalidate the verdict, at least unless their harmlessness is made to
appear., 66 The Court found that the affidavits before it were within this
rule, meaning that "their exclusion constitute[d] reversible error., 67
But what exactly was the rule? Mattox stands for the proposition that
jurors could impeach their verdicts after trial through testimony concerning
"external causes," i.e., extraneous prejudicial information, such as the
newspaper article, and improper outside influences, such as the bailiffs
comments.68 Justice Fuller, however, failed to answer clearly the question
of whether jurors could also testify regarding overt acts, such as the juror's
drunk and abusive behavior in Bailey, which were likely internal to the jury
deliberation process.69
The Supreme Court's next attempt at answering this question did not
help matters. Twenty years later, in Hyde v. United States, the Court was
presented with allegations that jurors in a four-defendant trial for conspiracy
to defraud the United States had improperly reached a compromise
verdict.70 In other words, jurors claimed that after some jurors wanted to
acquit all of the defendants and other jurors wanted to convict all of the
defendants, the entire jury compromised by deciding to convict two of the
defendants and acquit two others.7' Without much explication, the Court
found that the rule in Wright, which had allowed impeachment of a quotient
verdict, "should apply," but found that application of that rule precluded
impeachment of the compromise verdict.72
The last significant word that the Supreme Court had on jury
impeachment before the drafting of the Federal Rules of Evidence came
two years later in McDonald v. Pless.7 3 In McDonald, attorneys brought a
civil lawsuit against a former client to recover $4,000 he allegedly owed
651d. at 147-49.
661d. at 149-50.67 1d. at 149.
68 1d. at 149-50.
69See Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140 (1892).
70225 U.S. 347, 382-83 (1912).
7'id.
721d. at 3 83-84.
"3238 U.S. 264 (1915).
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them in legal fees and were awarded $2,916 by the jury.74 The client
subsequently moved to set aside the verdict on the basis of a juror's
affidavit, which averred that the jury reached a quotient verdict.75 In
deciding whether the jurors should be able to impeach their verdict under
these circumstances, the Court found that it had to "choose between
redressing the injury of the private litigant and inflicting the public injury
which would result if jurors were permitted to testify as to what had
happened in the jury room.",76 The Court found that the possibility of
private redress was insufficient to outweigh the danger of jury room
scrutiny, and chose what it deemed "the lesser of two evils," famously
concluding:
[L]et it once be established that verdicts solemnly made
and publicly returned into court can be attacked and set
aside on the testimony of those who took part in their
publication and all verdicts could be, and many would be,
followed by an inquiry in the hope of discovering
something which might invalidate the finding. Jurors
would be harassed and beset by the defeated party in an
effort to secure from them evidence of facts which might
establish misconduct sufficient to set aside a verdict. If
evidence thus secured could be thus used, the result would
be to make what was intended to be a private deliberation,
the constant subject of public investigation; to the
destruction of all frankness and freedom of discussion and
conference.77
The Court then acknowledged that some courts and legislatures had
permitted jury impeachment through evidence of overt acts of misconduct
and concluded that "the argument in favor of receiving such evidence is not
only very strong, but unanswerable-when looked at solely from the
standpoint of the private party who has been wronged by such
misconduct., 78 But the Court nonetheless found that this argument was
insufficient because, while precluding such overt act, impeachment "may
often exclude the only possible evidence of misconduct, a change in the rule
74 1d. at 265.
75id.
76Id. at 267.
77Id. at 267-68.
71Id. at 268.
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'would open the door to the most pernicious arts and tampering with
jurors. ,,79
This is not to say, though, that the Supreme Court was reinstating the
Iron Curtain that was Mansfield's Rule. 0 Instead, the Court read Reid and
Mattox as "recogniz[ing] that it would not be safe to lay down any
inflexible rule because there might be instances in which such testimony of
the juror could not be excluded without 'violating the plainest principles of
justice."' 8' The Court simply found that "there [wa]s nothing in the nature
of the present case warranting a departure from what is unquestionably the
general rule, that the losing party cannot, in order to secure a new trial, use
the testimony of jurors to impeach their verdict. 82
Significantly, the Court ended by clarifying that this general rule was
only applicable in civil cases.83 According to the Court, "[t]he suggestion
that, if this be the true rule, then jurors could not be witnesses in criminal
cases, or in contempt proceedings brought to punish wrongdoers, is without
foundation."84  The Court forcefully responded that the general rule it
announced was "limited to those instances in which a private party seeks to
use a juror as a witness to impeach the verdict."8 5
B. The Legislative History Behind Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b)
1 .The Initial 1969 Draft of Rule 606(b)
When the Supreme Court initially proposed the Federal Rules of
Evidence, Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) read as follows:
Rule 6-06. Competency of Juror as Witness...
(b) Inquiry into Validity of Verdict or Indictment. Upon an
inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror
may not testify concerning the effect of anything upon his
or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing him to
assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or
79 1d.
8 0
id.
8 1Id. at 268-69 (quoting Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 148 (1892)).
82 1d. at 269.
83id.
85 1d.
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concerning his mental processes in connection therewith.
Nor may his affidavit or evidence of any statement by him
indicating an effect of this kind be received for these
purposes.
86
In proposing a rule similar to the Iowa Rule, the Committee explicitly
referenced the Supreme Court of Iowa's opinion in Wright in its Advisory
Committee Note, asserting that it was part of a trend of precedent
precluding jury impeachment concerning jurors' mental processes but
permitting impeachment concerning the existence of conditions or
occurrences, "without regard to whether the happening [wa]s within or
without the jury room." 87 In so doing, the Committee rejected "[t]he
familiar rubric that a juror may [never] impeach his own verdict, dating
from Lord Mansfield's time, [a]s a gross oversimplification," and cited
Mattox for the proposition that "the door of the jury room is not a
satisfactory dividing point" for a jury impeachment rule.88
Relying on McDonald, the Committee found that preventing jurors from
being able to impeach their verdicts after trial promotes several values,
including "freedom of deliberation, stability and finality of verdicts, and
protection of jurors against annoyance and embarrassment., 89 At the same
time, the Committee cautioned that "simply putting verdicts beyond
effective reach can only promote irregularity and injustice." 90  The
Committee thus saw its proposed rule as "an accommodation between these
competing considerations" because "[t]he jurors are the persons who know
what really happened.91 Allowing them to testify as to matters other than
their own inner reactions involves no particular hazard to the values sought
to be protected.,
92
2.1971 's Hasty Rewrite
The Committee thereafter included the exact same text of Proposed
86 Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence, 46 F.R.D. 161, 289-90 (1969).
87 Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence, Advisory Committee's Note, 46 F.R.D.
161,291 (1969).881d. at 290, 291.
91d. at 290.
9 01d.
91Id. at 290-91.
92 1d. at 291.
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Rule 606(b) in its second draft in 1971, but in September or October of
1971, the rule was "hastily rewritten .... and w[as] approved by the
Supreme Court and presented to Congress., 94 This rewrite was ostensibly
the result of "the extensive lobbying efforts of Senator McClellan and the
Justice Department." 95 In a letter from the Senator to the Chairman of the
Standing Committee, McClellan wrote:
Were it possible to overturn a decision because, in fact, it
was not based upon precedent, but bias, and this was an
issue that could be litigated, it would indeed be brought
before the courts. Present law, as I read it, wisely prohibits
this sort of inquiry .... 96
The hastily rewritten rule reflected McClellan's concern as it precluded
jurors from impeaching their verdicts by testifying concerning matters or
statements occurring during the jury deliberation process.9 7 This version of
the Rule read:
Rule 606. Competency of Juror as Witness...
(b) Inquiry into validity of verdict or indictment.-Upon an
inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror
may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring
during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect
of anything upon his or any other juror's mind or emotions
as influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict
or indictment or concerning his mental processes in
connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the
question whether extraneous prejudicial information was
improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any
outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any
juror. Nor may his affidavit or evidence of any statement
by him concerning a matter about what he would be
precluded from testifying be received for these purposes.
98
93 Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence, 46 F.R.D. 161, 289-90 (1969).
94 Christman, supra note 43, at 824 n.141.
951d.
96117 CONG. REC. 33,641, 33,645 (1971) (letter from Sen. McClellan).
97 See id.
98FED. R. EviD. 606(b) (1974) (repealed 1987).
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According to the 1972 Advisory Committee's Note to this version of the
proposed rule, the rule protected "each of the components of deliberation,
including arguments, statements, discussions, mental and emotional
reactions, votes, and any other feature of the process." 99 Thus, under this
version of Rule 606(b), jurors would not be competent to impeach their
verdicts after trial through testimony concerning "a compromise verdict; a
quotient verdict; speculation as to insurance coverage; misinterpretation of
instructions; mistake in returning verdict; [or] interpretation of guilty plea
by one defendant as implicating others."' 00 Conversely, jurors would be
competent to impeach their verdicts after trial through testimony
concerning: (1) "prejudicial extraneous information" such as "a prejudicial
newspaper account," or (2) "influences injected or brought to bear upon the
deliberative process" such as "statements by the bailiff."''
°
The note made clear that Rule 606(b) "does not purport to specify the
substantive grounds for setting aside verdicts for irregularity; it deals only
with the competency of jurors to testify concerning those grounds." 102
According to the Committee, "[t]he present rules does not relate to secrecy
and disclosure but to the competency of certain witnesses and evidence.'
0 3
3. The House-Senate Debate
The House, however, rejected this new draft and was "[p]ersuaded that
the better practice [wa]s that provided in the earlier drafts."' 04 Specifically,
the House took issue with this new draft because, under it, "a quotient
verdict could not be attacked through the testimony of a juror, nor could a
juror testify to the drunken condition of a fellow juror which so disabled
him that he could not participate in the jury's deliberations."'' 0 5 Conversely,
after vigorous debate, the Senate opted for the Supreme Court's version,
concluding that the House's "extension of the ability to impeach a verdict
[wa]s... unwarranted and ill-advised."'' 0 6 As support for this position, the
99 FED. R. EVID. 606 advisory committee's note.
1°°Id. (citations omitted).
10 11d.
12id.
103Id.
t4H.R. REP. No. 93-650 (1973), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7075, 7083.
105 Id.
106S. REP. No. 93-1277 (1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7060.
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Senate cited to the aforementioned famous conclusion °7 of the Supreme
Court in McDonald and cautioned that the House version of the rule "would
permit the harassment of former jurors by losing parties as well as the
possible exploitation of disgruntled or otherwise badly-motivated ex-
jurors." 10 8 Finding that "[p]ublic policy requires a finality to litigation" and
that "common fairness requires that absolute privacy be preserved for
jurors," the Senate thus found that "rule 606 should not permit any inquiry
into the internal deliberations of the jurors.' 10 9
Eventually, the Senate and House Committee resolved the dispute in the
Senate's favor." 0  The Advisory Committee's Note to the enacted rule
explains the import of this decision.11' According to that note, the rejected
House version of the rule permitted "a juror to testify about objective
matters occurring during the jury's deliberation, such as the misconduct of
another juror or the reaching of a quotient verdict.' 1 2 Meanwhile, the
approved Senate version of the rule precluded "juror testimony about any
matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's
deliberations."' 13 But, the Senate version did allow jurors to testify as to
"whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the
jury's attention and on the question whether any outside influence was
improperly brought to bear on any jurors."' 14 Most states have counterparts
to Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) that generally preclude jury
impeachment, subject to the above two exceptions. 15
C. Post-Enactment Rule 606(b) Developments
1. The Sixth Amendment Challenge to Rule 606(b)
In Tanner v. United States, William Conover and Anthony Tanner were
107 See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
'
0
'S. REP. No. 93-1277 (1974).109 1d.
10 H.R. REP. No. 93-1597 (1973), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7098, 7102.
12id.
113 d.
11Id.
115 Barry Tarlow, True Purpose of Local Federal Rules Prohibiting Lawyers from Contacting
Jurors After a Verdict, THE CHAMPION, Dec. 1997, at 46, 46.
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convicted of mail fraud and conspiring to defraud the United States.l 6 The
day before the two men were scheduled to be sentenced, Tanner filed a
motion, subsequently joined by Conover, which sought "continuance of the
sentencing date, permission to interview jurors, an evidentiary hearing, and
a new trial."'"1 7 Tanner attached to the motion an affidavit which indicated
that a juror made an unsolicited call to his attorney and stated "that several
of the jurors consumed alcohol during lunch breaks at various times
throughout the trial, causing them to sleep through the afternoons." 118
The district court found that juror affidavits or testimony relating to
juror intoxication were inadmissible pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence
606(b) and denied the motion in all respects. 19 While their appeal was
pending, Tanner and Conover filed another new trial motion based upon an
"unsolicited visit" by juror Daniel Hardy to the residence of Tanner's
attorney. 120 Hardy indicated in a sworn interview that he "felt like.., the
jury was on one big party. ,12 He claimed that seven jurors drank alcohol
during noon recess, with four jurors (including Hardy), imbibing between
them "'a pitcher to three pitchers"' of beer during various recesses and the
foreperson having a liter of wine on three occasions 22 He also alleged that
during trial, two jurors ingested cocaine, three jurors regularly smoked
marijuana, and one juror even sold another juror a quarter pound of
marijuana. 12 Perhaps, then, it is unsurprising that Hardy contended that a
juror described himself to Hardy as "flying" and that other jurors fell asleep
during the trial. 124 Finding that these allegations differed quantitatively but
not qualitatively from the earlier allegations, the district court again denied
the motion for a new trial, and the Eleventh Circuit thereafter affirmed. 125
The Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari and began its
analysis by noting the "external/internal distinction" of Federal Rule of
Evidence 606(b).' 26 Importantly, however, in her majority opinion, Justice
116483 U.S. 107, 109-10 (1987).
1"7 1d. at 113.
1181d.
1191d.
120Id. at 115.
121id.
122 id.
1231d. at 115-16.
1241d. at 116.
1251d.
1261d. at 116-17.
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O'Connor noted that the common law rule leading to the Rule's dichotomy
"was not based on whether the juror was literally inside or outside the jury
room when the alleged irregularity took place; rather, the distinction was
based on the nature of the allegation."' 127 As an example, the Court noted
that a juror could impeach his verdict by testifying concerning a newspaper
read in the jury room but could not impeach his verdict by claiming that he
misheard or miscomprehended the judge's instructions, despite the jury
charge occurring outside of the jury room. 128 Applying this calculus to the
allegations at hand, and liberally citing to the McDonald opinion, Justice
O'Connor concluded that there could be no jury impeachment because,
"[h]owever ... improper their use, drugs or alcohol voluntarily ingested by
a juror seem[ed] no more an 'outside influence' than a virus, poorly
prepared food, or lack of sleep."'
129
The petitioners' appeal, however, was not limited to arguing that the
lower courts improperly applied Rule 606(b). 130 Instead, they also alleged
"that the refusal to hold an evidentiary hearing at which jurors would testify
as to their conduct 'violat[ed] the sixth amendment's guarantee to a fair trial
before an impartial and competent jury.' ' 131 Justice O'Connor parried this
claim, noting that "long-recognized and very substantial concerns support
the protection of jury deliberations from intrusive inquiry" and that the
petitioners' Sixth Amendment interests in a competent jury were at least
partially protected by certain aspects of the trial process. 32 For instance,
O'Connor noted that jurors could come forward during trial with allegations
of juror misconduct and that the attorneys, the trial judge, and court
personnel could observe jurors' demeanors during trial. 133 She also cited
with approval United States v. Taliaferro, an opinion in which the Fourth
Circuit found that a marshal could render post-trial testimony regarding
jurors' consumption of alcohol after the judge sent the jury and the marshal
to a private club for dinner when the jurors were deadlocked for hours. 134
According to O'Connor, because the marshal's testimony did not consist of
the jurors impeaching their verdict, its admission did not violate Rule
"'7Id. at 117.
121Id. at 118.
1291d. at 122.
13Id. at 126.
131d.
132 Id. at 127.
133id.
13 4 Id. (citing 558 F.2d 724, 725-26 (4th Cir. 1977)).
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606(b).13 The Court thus concluded that the district court's failure to hold
an evidentiary hearing did not violate the petitioners' Sixth Amendment
right to a competent jury.136
2. The 2006 Amendment to Rule 606(b)
In 2006, to resolve a circuit split that had developed over whether post-
trial jury testimony was permitted to establish "proof of clerical errors,"
Congress made one final change to Rule 606(b):' 37 the addition of a clause
allowing jurors to testify after trial about "whether there was a mistake in
entering the verdict onto the verdict form."1 38 In making this addition,
Congress "specifically reject[ed] the broader exception, adopted by some
courts, permitting the use of juror testimony to prove that the jurors were
operating under a misunderstanding about the consequences of the result
that they agreed upon."' 13
9
The Advisory Committee's Note to the 2006 amendment indicated that
this "broader exception [wa]s rejected because an inquiry into whether the
jury misunderstood or misapplied an instruction goes to the juror's mental
processes underlying the verdict, rather than the verdict's accuracy in
capturing what the jurors had agreed upon."'140 Rather, Congress decided
that the new clause was "limited to cases such as 'where the jury foreperson
wrote down, in response to an interrogatory, a number different from that
agreed upon by the jury, or mistakenly stated that the defendant was 'guilty'
when the jury had actually agreed that the defendant was not guilty.' 141
After this 2006 amendment, Rule 606(b) currently reads as follows:
Rule 606. Competency of Juror as Witness...
(b) Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or
indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or
statement occurring during the course of the jury's
deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any
other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to
"Id. at 127.
136 id.
137 FED. R. EvID. 606(b) advisory committee's note.
"'Id. 606(b)(3).
1
39 Id. 606(b) advisory committee's note.
140Id.
1
4 1
1d.
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assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or
concerning the juror's mental processes in connection
therewith. But a juror may testify about (1) whether
extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought
to the jury's attention, (2) whether any outside influence
was improperly brought to bear upon any juror, or
(3) whether there was a mistake in entering the verdict onto
the verdict form. A juror's affidavit or evidence of any
statement by the juror may not be received on a matter
about which the juror would be precluded from
testifying.
142
Under this new, third exception to Rule 606(b), jurors can impeach their
verdicts through testimony regarding clerical errors such as the foreperson
mistakenly deducting twenty percent from the jury's verdict for the
plaintiff. 43 Conversely, even with the new exception, jurors still cannot
testify that their verdict was based upon a misunderstanding of the jury
instructions or the consequences of their verdict. 144  As an example, in
United States v. Jackson, several jurors sought to testify that they gave the
defendant the death penalty because they incorrectly thought that if they
sentenced him to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, he
could still be released before the end of his life. 145 In its 2008 opinion, the
Fifth Circuit precluded this proposed jury impeachment, finding that jurors
could not impeach their verdicts through allegations of misunderstood jury
instructions.
146
3. Applying Rule 606(b) in the Wake of Tanner
Since Tanner, courts have applied Rule 606(b) by using Tanner's
characterization of the rule's internal/external dichotomy. Courts have
precluded jurors from impeaching their verdicts on the basis of allegations
relating to anything internal to the jury deliberation process, such as claims
that jurors took the defendant's refusal to testify as evidence of his guilt, 147
14 2 FED. R. EVID. 606(b).
14 3 Eastridge Dev. Co. v. Halpert Assocs., Inc., 853 F.2d 772, 783 (10th Cir. 1988).
144See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 549 F.3d 963, 983-84 (5th Cir. 2008).
145id.
46id.; see also Posting of Colin Miller to Evidence ProfBlog,
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/evidenceprof/2008/1 1/essential-eleme.html (Nov. 30, 2008).
147See United States v. Kelley, 461 F.3d 817, 831-32 (6th Cir. 2006).
[Vol. 61:3
HeinOnline  -- 61 Baylor L. Rev. 894 2009
RIGHT TO PRESENT A DEFENSE
misunderstood jury instructions, 148 reached a majority verdict, 149 and
threatened each other.' 50  Conversely, courts have permitted jurors to
impeach their verdicts based upon anything external to the process, whether
it be external evidence or an external influence. Accordingly, courts have
allowed jurors to testify regarding improperly received extraneous
prejudicial information such as jurors learning that the defendant was
already incarcerated for another offense.151 Courts have also allowed jurors
to testify regarding improper outside influences, whether the alleged
influencer was the judge,'52 bailiff,'53 detective,' 54 or a family member of a
party.
55
4. The Application of Rule 606(b) to Allegations of Racial or
Other Bias
Rule 606(b) "has repeatedly been held to preclude a juror from
testifying, in support of a motion for a new trial, that juror conduct during
deliberations suggests the verdict was tainted by racial bias."'' 56  A few
courts, such as the Supreme Court of Minnesota in State v. Bowles, have
found that "[r]ace-based pressure constitutes 'extraneous prejudicial
information' about which a juror may testify."' 57  And while the Sixth
Circuit in Mason v. Mitchell found that a juror's use of racial slurs is an
148 See United States v. Wickersham, 29 F.3d 191, 194 (5th Cir. 1994).
14 9 See Edwards v. State, 997 So. 2d 241, 246-47 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008); Posting of Colin
Miller to EvidenceProf Blog, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/evidenceprof/2008/12/606(b)-
edwards-v.html (Dec. 26, 2008).
'
5
°See United States v. McGhee, 532 F.3d 733, 740-41 (8th Cir. 2008); Posting of Colin
Miller to EvidenceProf Blog, http:/Ilawprofessors.typepad.com/evidenceprof/2008/07/606b-juror-
inti.html (July 13, 2008).
151See State v. Allen, No. 06-1495, 2008 WL 5234319, at *2-3 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 17,
2008); Posting of Colin Miller to EvidenceProf Blog,
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/evidenceprof/2008/12/606b-state-v-al.html (Dec. 22, 2008).
152See United States v. Scisum, 32 F.3d 1479, 1481-83 (10th Cir. 1994).
153 See Henri v. Curto, 891 N.E.2d 135, 141-42 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008); Posting of Colin Miller
to EvidenceProf Blog, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/evidenceprof/2008/08/606b-henri-v-
cu.html (Aug. 2, 2008).
154 See State v. Lewis, 654 S.E.2d 808, 809-11 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008); Posting of Colin Miller
to EvidenceProf Blog, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/evidenceprof/2008/01/do-the-right-
th.html (Jan. 22, 2008).
t55See, e.g., Davis v. State, 770 N.E.2d 319, 325 n.4 (Ind. 2002).
56 Gold, supra note 13, at 126, 128.
157530 N.W.2d 521, 536 (Minn. 1995).
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internal influence rather than an improper outside influence, 158 the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee recently deemed
that opinion "unsupported by any discussion."'159 Finally, other courts, such
as the Supreme Court of South Carolina in State v. Hunter, have found that
juror testimony concerning juror racial bias is admissible, not under Rule
606(b)'s exceptions, but because its exclusion would deprive defendants of
due process.'
60
Overall, however, there is "little dissent from the proposition" that
Rule 606(b) precludes jurors from impeaching their verdicts based upon
allegations of racial, religious, or other bias by jurors.16' For the most part,
courts have found that biased remarks by jurors are neither "extraneous"
nor "information." 162 Also, courts have largely concluded that juror bias is
an internal or intra-jury influence rather than the type of improper outside
influence that can form the proper predicate for jury impeachment.1 63
Finally, most courts have extrapolated Tanner's conclusion that application
of Rule 606(b) does not violate defendants' Sixth Amendment right to a
competent jury to reach the broader conclusion that applying Rule 606(b) to
preclude jury impeachment concerning jurors using racial, religious, or
other slurs similarly does not violate the Sixth Amendment right to an
impartial jury.'64
Sometimes, court opinions such as those in the introduction lay out in
graphic detail the exact nature of the injustice that Rule 606(b) wreaks in
such cases. For instance, in Smith v. Brewer, the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Iowa denied the habeas petition of an
58320 F.3d 604, 636-37 (6th Cir. 2003).
159 United States v. Taylor, No. 1:04-CR-160, 2009 WL 311138, at *8 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 6,
2009). The rest of the Eastern District of Tennessee's opinion, however, made clear that the court
would never allow jurors to impeach their verdicts after trial through allegations ofjuror bias. See
Posting of Colin Miller to EvidenceProf Blog,
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/evidenceprof/2009/02/i-arn-currently.html (Feb. 14, 2009).
'60463 S.E.2d 314, 316 (S.C. 1995).
161 Gold, supra note 13, at 128.
162 Shillcutt v. Gagnon, 602 F. Supp. 1280, 1283 (E.D. Wis. 1985).
163See, e.g., State v. Finney, 337 N.W.2d 167, 169 (S.D. 1983) (finding that racist comments
by jurors are an intra-jury influence).
164See, e.g., United States v. Benally, 546 F.3d 1230, 1240 (10th Cir. 2008) ("The safeguards
that the Court relied upon for exposing the drug and alcohol use amongst jurors in Tanner are also
available to expose racial biases of the sort alleged in Mr. Benally's case."); see also Posting of
Colin Miller to EvidenceProf Blog, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/evidenceprof/2008/1 /ive-
written-two.html (Nov. 14, 2008).
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African-American convicted of first-degree murder, 165 a decision which the
Eighth Circuit later affirmed. 166 In so doing, it found that the Iowa state
courts had committed no error in using Rule 606(b) to preclude a juror from
testifying after trial that during deliberations another juror '"got up and
walked about the room in kind of a ... strutting away such as a minstrel
used to do and.. . used the black dialect to repeat some of the
things... (Mr. McKnight petitioner's black trial attorney) said."' 167
Meanwhile, in its 2008 opinion in United States v. Benally, the Tenth
Circuit found that a Native American man convicted of assaulting a Bureau
of Indian Affairs officer with a dangerous weapon was precluded under
Rule 606(b) from invalidating the verdict through allegations that during
deliberations, inter alia, (1) the jury foreman said, "'[w]hen Indians get
alcohol, they all get drunk,' and that when they get drunk, they get violent,"
and (2) other "jurors discussed the need to 'send a message back to the
reservation."1
68
Other times, it is difficult to measure the level of injustice because some
courts such as the Supreme Court of Tennessee 169 and the Court of Appeals
of Missouri 170 reject proposed juror testimony regarding "racial prejudice"
out of hand, without presenting any detail regarding the nature of the
allegations. Furthermore, sometimes a court is so vague in precluding
allegations of juror prejudice during trial that even the type of prejudice
alleged is unclear as in the Fifth Circuit's opinion in United States v.
Duzac. 1
7 1
Courts have even applied Rule 606(b) to prevent jurors from
impeaching their verdicts through allegations of racial bias when an
165 Smith v. Brewer, 444 F. Supp. 482, 488, 491 (S.D. Iowa 1978).
1
66 See generally Smith v. Brewer, 577 F.2d 466 (8th Cir. 1978).
167 Brewer, 444 F. Supp. at 488.
t'6 Benally, 546 F.3d at 1231-32, 1240.
169See State v. Blackwell, 664 S.W.2d 686, 689-90 (Tenn. 1984) ("Evidence was offered of
remarks made during the jury's deliberation that had racial overtones, the effect of which was said
to amount to pressure to vote to convict defendant, a black man. That evidence was inadmissible
under the exclusionary language of Rule 606(b) .... ).
170 See State v. Smith, 735 S.W.2d 65, 69-70 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (finding that a juror's post-
trial claim that claimed that the verdict was motivated by racial prejudice was "an improper
attempt to impeach the verdict").
171622 F.2d 911, 913-14 (5th Cir. 1980) (finding that allegations of juror prejudice were
inadmissible without specifying the type of prejudice alleged). The Fifth Circuit more clearly
excluded allegations of juror racial bias under Rule 606(b) the following year in Martinez v. Food
City, Inc., 658 F.2d 369, 373-74 (5th Cir. 1981).
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appellant has been given a death sentence. 172  The Supreme Court of
Georgia reached this conclusion in Spencer v. State, when it found that a
Georgia trial court properly precluded a death-sentenced African-American
appellant from presenting a juror's affidavit in which she indicated that "she
overheard two white jurors making racially derogatory comments about the
defendant during the jury's deliberations.' Similarly, in Bacon v. Lee,
the Fourth Circuit denied the habeas petition of a death-sentenced African-
American man, finding that the North Carolina state courts properly
precluded him from introducing the affidavit of an alternate juror, who
claimed that "she recalled jurors making racial jokes during the course of
the trial.' 74
III. THE RIGHT TO PRESENT A DEFENSE
A. The Supreme Court's Development of the Right to Present a
Defense
1. Introduction
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence.
175
Of the six rights contained in the Sixth Amendment, the late bloomer of
the bunch was clearly the accused's right "to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor."' 176  For almost two centuries, courts
172 See Spencer v. State, 398 S.E.2d 179, 184 (Ga. 1990); Bacon v. Lee, 225 F.3d 470, 485
(4th Cir. 2000).
1'398 S.E.2d 179, 184 (Ga. 1990).
174225 F.3d 470, 485 (4th Cir. 2000).
175 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
1761d.
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interpreted this Compulsory Process Clause as merely conferring on
criminal defendants the procedural right of being able to subpoena or
otherwise secure the presence of witnesses at trial. 177  Indeed, the
Compulsory Process Clause had become "almost a dead letter after 170
years of desuetude, before it was given new life in Washington v. Texas."'
78
In Washington v. Texas, the Supreme Court read the right to present a
defense into the Clause. 179 Including Washington v. Texas, the Court has
applied this right to evidentiary rulings seven times, 80 and while this
Supreme Court septet has given lower courts a "lack of guidance" on how
to apply the right, these opinions provided enough detail to allow lower
courts to fill in the blanks.
1 81
2. Washington v. Texas
Before the Supreme Court's 1967 opinion in Washington v. Texas, the
Court had mentioned the Compulsory Process Clause "only five times-
twice in dictum, and three times in the course of finding it unnecessary to
construe the clause,"' 82 making Washington v. Texas the Court's "first and
seminal opinion" on the Clause.' 83  Washington v. Texas seemingly
involved the classic tale of boy meets girl, boy loses girl, boy kills girl's
new boyfriend. But did it? Eighteen year-old Jackie Washington dated
Jean Carter until her mother forbade the relationship.' 84 Carter then took up
with another young man, and Washington responded by searching, not for
another young lady, but for a gun, which he found in the possession of one
177 See Louis S. Quinn, Note, Defense Witness Immunity-A "Fresh " Look at the Compulsory
Process Clause, 43 LA. L. REV. 239, 240 (1982) ("Traditionally, courts viewed the compulsory
process clause as granting the defendant the right to subpoena witnesses in his favor to appear in
court."); Peter Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REv. 71, 74 (1974) ("In a
series of cases since 1967, the Supreme Court has rejected the narrow construction, and has
recognized that compulsory process constitutionalizes the entire presentation of the defendant's
case.").
18 United States v. Vietor, 10 M.J. 69, 75 (C.M.A. 1980).
'
79See 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967).
180 See Janet C. Hoeffel, The Sixth Amendment's Lost Clause: Unearthing Compulsory
Process, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1275, 1289 & n.58 (2002). Hoeffel mentions five opinions in her
pre-Holmes article, omitting Green. See id.
'
811d. at 1353.
182 Peter Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of Evidence for
Criminal Cases, 91 HARV. L. REV. 567, 586 n.47 (1978).
183Id.
184 Washington v. State, 400 S.W.2d 756, 757 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966).
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Charles Fuller.185 Fuller's shotgun fired the fatal shot that felled Carter's
new suitor on the porch of Carter's house, with the question being whose
finger pulled the trigger.186  The Dallas District Attorney first charged
Fuller with the murder and secured his conviction along with a fifty year
sentence after the jury rejected his defense that he pulled the shotgun's
trigger without ever seeing the man who would be struck with its shell. 87
The district attorney then turned around and charged Washington with
murder with malice, and the jury again came back with a conviction and a
half-century sentence. 1
88
The jury's second verdict might seem indefensible in light of Fuller's
testimony at his trial, but Washington's jury never heard Fuller's version of
events. 89 Instead, the trial court precluded Washington from putting Fuller
on the witness stand, despite indications that Fuller also would have
testified that Washington tried to persuade him to leave and actually left
before Fuller fired the fatal shot.' 90 And it did so pursuant to two Texas
statutes which provided "that persons charged or convicted as
coparticipants in the same crime could not testify for one another."' 19
Washington's appeal eventually reached the Supreme Court, which
initially determined as a matter of first impression that the Compulsory
Process Clause was incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause and thus applied to state criminal trials.' 92 According to the
Court, "[t]he right of an accused to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor stands on no lesser footing than the other Sixth
Amendment rights that we have previously held applicable to the States.' 93
Instead, Chief Justice Warren concluded that "[t]he right to offer the
testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is in
plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to present the
defendant's version of facts as well as the prosecution's to the jury so it
may decide where the truth lies.' 194
1851d. at 757-58.
186Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 16 (1967).
187Id.
188 Washington v. State, 400 S.W.2d at 757.
89 Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. at 17.
190Id. at 16-17.
911d. at 16.
192 Id. at 18-19.
193 Id. at 18.
'
94 d. at 19.
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The Court then applied this new right to the circumstances of the case
before it and found it to be an especially good fit given the history of the
Compulsory Process Clause. 195 According to the Chief Justice, "the right to
compulsory process was included in the Bill of Rights in reaction to the
notorious common-law rule that in cases of treason or felony the accused
was not allowed to introduce witnesses in his defense at all."'196 The Clause,
though, was not a direct response to this absolute prohibition, which had
been abolished in England before the drafting of the United States
Constitution; it was, however, adopted against a common law backdrop of
rules rendering certain categories of individuals incompetent to testify at
trial despite the fact that they were "physically and mentally capable of
testifying."'
' 97
Such "incompetent" witnesses included spouses under the doctrine of
coverture, atheists on the ground of irreligion, and individuals convicted of
felonies or crimes of crimen falsi under the doctrine of disqualification for
infamy.198 In spite of the Compulsory Process Clause, "[t]he federal courts
followed the[se] common law restrictions for a time" because they were on
the books at the time of the Judiciary Act of 1789.199 These rules, however,
eventually fell out of favor, with the Supreme Court greasing the wheels on
the process by striking down the doctrine of disqualification for infamy in
1918 in Rosen v. United States, concluding "that the dead hand of the
common-law rule of 1789 should no longer be applied to such cases as we
have here .... ,,200
In Washington v. Texas, Chief Justice Warren noted that Rosen was
decided on non-constitutional grounds but nonetheless found that its
reasoning was required by the Compulsory Process Clause.2°' Warren
adduced from Rosen that a state would violate the Clause "if it made all
defense testimony inadmissible as a matter of procedural law., 202  The
Chief Justice then analogized this finding to the case before him and
concluded that "[i]t is difficult to see how the Constitution is any less
'"Id. at 19-23.
1961d. at 19.
1"Id. at 19-20.
198See Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability
of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1369 n.35 (1985).
99 Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. at 21.
200245 U.S. 467, 471 (1918).
201 Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. at 22.
202Id.
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violated by arbitrary rules that prevent whole categories of defense
witnesses from testifying on the basis of a priori categories that presume
them untrustworthy of belief.
20 3
Alternatively, the Court concluded that the Texas statutes could not
even be defended on the ground that they "rationally set[] apart a group of
persons who are particularly likely to commit perjury. 20 4  While these
statutes precluded a charged or convicted co-participant from providing
exculpatory testimony in favor of his alleged partner in crime, they:
(1) removed this proscription if the co-participant was exonerated, and
(2) never precluded such a co-participant from providing incriminatory
testimony as a witness for the prosecution. 205
According to the Chief Justice, Texas thus denied Washington his right
to present a defense because it "arbitrarily denied him the right to put on the
stand a witness who was physically and mentally capable of testifying to
events he had personally observed, and whose testimony would have been
relevant and material to the defense. 20 6  What seemed to support this
finding of materiality was the Court's earlier conclusion that Fuller's
testimony was "vital" because he "was the only person other than
[Washington] who knew exactly who had fired the shotgun," rendering his
proposed testimony the "only testimony available on a crucial issue. 207
In a terminal footnote, however, the Court cautioned:
Nothing in this opinion should be construed as
disapproving testimonial privileges, such as the privilege
against self-incrimination or the lawyer-client or husband-
wife privileges, which are based on entirely different
considerations from those underlying the common-law
disqualifications for interest. Nor do we deal in this case
with nonarbitrary state rules that disqualify as witnesses
persons who, because of mental infirmity of infancy, are
incapable of observing events or testifying about them.20 8
203 Id.
204id.
201d. at 17 n.4.
2061d. at 23.
2171d. at 16, 21.
2
°
8Id. at 23 n.21.
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3. Chambers v. Mississippi
While the Supreme Court waited nearly two centuries before creating
the right to present a defense, it took only another four years before it found
that another evidentiary ruling violated that right, although it did not
explicitly reference the Compulsory Process Clause. In Chambers v.
Mississippi, Leon Chambers was tried in Mississippi for the murder of a
policeman and advanced the defense that another man, Gable McDonald,
committed the crime.20 9 There was significant evidence to support this
defense.210 Before trial, McDonald gave a sworn confession to Chambers'
attorney in which he admitted to killing the policeman, but he later
repudiated that confession to police and was never charged.211 McDonald's
sworn confession, however, was apparently not the first time that he had
admitted to the murder; instead, Chambers had three friends of McDonald
ready to testify that he confessed to them before giving his sworn
confession.21 2
But while the jurors heard about McDonald's sworn confession and
subsequent repudiation, they never heard about these other three
confessions.213 Rather, the trial judge precluded the friends from testifying
about McDonald's other confessions because they constituted inadmissible
214hearsay. Moreover, the prosecution had no reason to call McDonald,
making him a defense witness, and the judge found that under Mississippi's
voucher rule, Chambers was precluded from impeaching his own witness
through questions regarding his three other confessions.21 5
After Chambers was convicted and unsuccessfully challenged his
conviction in the Mississippi state court system, 216 he appealed to the
217United States Supreme Court, which eventually granted certiorari.
Addressing the second evidentiary ruling first, Justice Powell found that the
trial judge's application of the voucher rule meant that Chambers was
"effectively prevented from exploring the circumstances of McDonald's
209410 U.S. 284, 287-89 (1973).
2 1
°1d. at 289.
2 11 Chambers v. State, 252 So. 2d 217, 218 (Miss. 1971).
212 Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. at 292.
213id.
214id.
2 151d. at 292-95.
216 Chambers v. State, 252 So. 2d at 220.
217 Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. at 284.
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three prior oral confessions and from challenging the renunciation of the
written confession."2" 8  Accordingly, the Court concluded that "[t]he
'voucher' rule, as applied in this case, plainly interfered with Chambers'
right defend against the State's charges. 21 9
The Court then viewed this ruling in conjunction with the trial judge's
hearsay ruling and determined that the friends' testimony was inadmissible
because Mississippi had a hearsay exception for statements against
pecuniary interests but no exception for statements against penal interest.220
Justice Powell noted that states such as Mississippi justified the distinction
between these two types of statements against interest on the ground that
"confessions of criminal activity are often motivated by extraneous
considerations and, therefore, are not as inherently reliable as statements
against pecuniary or propriety interest.
221
The Court then noted that there had been significant scholarly criticism
of this dichotomy.222 However, the Court concluded that it did not need to
resolve this dispute because McDonald's confessions "were originally made
and subsequently offered at trial under circumstances that provided
considerable assurance of their reliability., 223 Namely, inter alia, "[t]he
sheer number of independent confessions provided... corroboration," each
of the confessions was "unquestionably against interest," and McDonald
was available to be "cross-examined by the State. 2 24 Therefore, Justice
Powell found additional error by the trial court, 25 concluding that, "where
constitutional rights directly affecting the ascertainment of guilt are
implicated, the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically to defeat
the ends of justice. 226
Justice Powell's opinion explicitly referenced neither Washington v.
Texas nor the Compulsory Process Clause in finding a violation of
Chambers' right to present a defense because Chambers raised no
constitutional objection at trial. 227 The Court thus apparently "assumed that
218ld. at 296-97.
2 1 91d. at 298.
220Id. at 299.
221 Id. at 299-300.
2 2 2Id. at 300.
223Id.
2241d. at 300-01.
2251d. at 302.
226
1d.
227Westen, supra note 181, at 607 n.108.
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the only constitutional question properly before it rested on due process,
rather than on Chambers' newly advanced... compulsory process
argument[] .... ,228 The Court, however, would eventually mesh Chambers
v. Mississippi and Washington v. Texas under the same right to present a
defense umbrella fifteen years later, but not before the Court expanded upon
its holding in Chambers v. Mississippi.
4. Green v. Georgia
The Supreme Court's 1979 opinion in Green v. Georgia was similar
to its opinion in Chambers v. Mississippi, except that it involved the
mechanistic application of only one rule of evidence, and that ruling
occurred during sentencing.229 In Green, Roosevelt Green, Jr. and Carzell
Moore were both convicted of the rape and murder of Teresa Carol Allen in
separate trials.230 Green was actually convicted at a first trial,23 1 and then,
during his second trial for sentencing, he sought to introduce the testimony
of Thomas Pasby, who testified at Moore's trial that "Moore had confided
to him that he had killed Allen, shooting her twice after ordering [Green] to
run an errand., 232 The trial court, however, rebuffed this attempt because,
like Mississippi, Georgia had a hearsay exception for statements against
pecuniary interest but no exception for statements against penal interest.
233
Green's appeal eventually reached the United States Supreme Court,2 34
which found that that "[t]he excluded testimony was highly relevant to a
critical issue in the punishment phase of trial and substantial reasons existed
to assume its reliability." The court found "[t]he evidence corroborating the
confession was ample," "[t]he statement was against interest" and,
"[p]erhaps most important, the State considered the testimony sufficiently
reliable to use it against Moore, and to base a sentence of death upon it."
235
Citing to Chambers v. Mississippi, the Court concluded that the Georgia
state courts acted unconstitutionally because "[i]n these unique
circumstances, 'the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically to
2281d.
229 See 442 U.S. 95, 97 (1979).
23
.Id. at 95.
"'Id. at 96.
2321d.
2331 Id. at 96 n. 1.
234 Id. at 96.
235Id. at 97 (internal citations omitted).
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defeat the ends of justice.' '236
5. Crane v. Kentucky
In Crane v. Kentucky, somebody shot and killed a clerk at the Keg
Liquor Store in Louisville, Kentucky during the course of a robbery. 237 The
police, however, were hampered in their investigation by "[a] complete
absence of identifying physical evidence" to connect anyone to the crime.238
But a week after the shooting, the fog lifted, and manna fell into the
police's laps.239 At that time, police arrested and questioned sixteen-year-
old Major Crane in connection with an unrelated service station holdup.24 °
According to the police, "'just out of the clear blue sky,' [Crane] began to
confess to a host of local crimes, including shooting a police officer,
robbing a hardware store, and robbing several individuals at a bowling
alley. 24' Their curiosities piqued, the officers transferred Crane to a
juvenile detention center and continued to interrogate him, whereupon he
initially denied being involved with the Keg Liquors shooting before
eventually confessing to that crime.24 2
The State subsequently indicted Crane for murder, and he moved to
suppress his confession, claiming that the police impermissibly coerced the
statement from him.243 According to Crane, he falsely confessed to the
crime only after he was detained in a windowless room for a protracted
period of time, repeatedly denied contact with his mother, and surrounded
by as many as six officers, who constantly badgered him.244 Despite
Crane's claims, the court credited the police version of events and denied
Crane's motion to suppress his confession as involuntary, finding that there
was "no sweating or coercion of the defendant., 245
The case then proceeded to trial, where defense counsel asserted in his
opening statement that Crane's confession was "rife with inconsistencies"
236Id. (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973)).
217476 U.S. 683, 684 (1986).
238 id.
239 See id.
240 id.
2411d.
242 id.
241d. at 684-85.
2441d. at 685.
245 See id. at 684-85.
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and that "the very circumstances surrounding the giving of the [confession]
[we]re enough to cast doubt on its credibility. 246 The prosecutor responded
by bringing a motion in limine, arguing that any testimony in support of
these claims would be solely related to the involuntariness of Crane's
confession, which was "a 'legal matter' that had already been resolved by
the court in its earlier ruling., 247 The trial court agreed, the jury found
Crane guilty of murder, and Crane's evidentiary appeal was rejected by the
Kentucky Supreme Court,248 which found that "under established Kentucky
procedure a trial court's pretrial voluntariness determination is conclusive
and may not be relitigated at trial. 249
After granting certiorari, the United States Supreme Court disagreed in a
1986 opinion on the ground that this Kentucky law "finds no support in our
cases." 250  Instead, the Court found that testimony concerning the
circumstances surrounding confessions bears on their credibility as well as
their voluntariness. 25' Accordingly, the Court concluded that even if a
confession is deemed voluntary and admissible, "as with any other part of
the prosecutor's case, [it] may be shown to be 'insufficiently corroborated
or otherwise... unworthy of belief."
252
The Court then noted that as a result of the application of this Kentucky
procedure to the proffered testimony concerning Crane's confession, Crane
was "effectively disabled from answering the one question every rational
juror needs answered: If the defendant is innocent, why did he previously
admit his guilt? 253 At the same time, the Court acknowledged that it was
reticent to "impose constitutional constraints on ordinary evidentiary
rulings 254 because of the "wide latitude" extended to judges to exclude
evidence that is merely "repetitive" or "marginally relevant. 255  But
notwithstanding this reluctance, the Court found that it had "little trouble
concluding on the facts of this case that the blanket exclusion of the
proffered testimony about the circumstances of [Crane's] confession
2 4 6 Id. at 685.
2471d. at 685-86.
2481d. at 686.
2 4 9 Id. at 686-87.
250 Id. at 687.
251 Id. at 688.
152Id. at 689 (quoting Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 485-86 (1972)).
2 5 4
1d
255 Id. at 689-90 (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986)).
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deprived him of a fair trial. 25
6
And it found such a deprivation by weaving strands from Washington v.
Texas,257 Chambers v. Mississippi,258 the Compulsory Process Clause, the
Due Process Clause, and the Confrontation Clause into the modem right to
present a defense patchwork. 259 According to the Court, "whether rooted
directly in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, or in the
Compulsory Process or Confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the
Constitution guarantees criminal defendants 'a meaningful opportunity to
present a complete defense.'
260
The Court then fleshed out this conclusion, pointing out that this right
"would be an empty one if the State were permitted to exclude competent,
reliable evidence bearing on the credibility of a confession when such
evidence is central to the defendant's claim of innocence. 261  Instead,
because Crane's defense was, in large part, that his earlier admission was
not credible,262 reversal was required on the ground that "introducing
evidence of the physical circumstances that yielded the confession was all
but indispensable to any chance of its succeeding. 263
6. Rock v. Arkansas
This emboldened right to present a defense produced a Supreme Court
opinion the following year which was seemingly compelled by the above
language but shocking nonetheless. In Rock v. Arkansas, the State charged
Vicki Lorene Rock with manslaughter in connection with the death of her
husband after a scuffle between the two culminated with a fatal bullet
wound to his chest.264 When Rock was unable to remember the exact
details of the shooting, her attorney had licensed neuropsychologist Bettye
Back hypnotize her twice to refresh her memory.265  After being
256 Id. at 690.
257See generally Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
2 58 See generally Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
259 Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986).
260 1d. at 690 (internal citations omitted) (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485
(1984)).26 11d.
2621d. at 691.
263 1d.
264483 U.S. 44, 45 (1987).
2651d. at 46.
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hypnotized, Rock recalled that at the time of the shooting, she did not have
her finger on the gun's trigger;266 instead, it "discharged when her husband
grabbed her arm during the scuffle. 2 67 This revelation led her attorney to
have a gun expert examine the manslaughter weapon, and the expert
concluded that "the gun was defective and prone to fire[] when hit or
dropped, without the trigger's being pulled.
268
While the gun expert later testified regarding this conclusion at trial, the
judge precluded Rock from testifying regarding any matters that she
recalled due to the hypnosis "because of inherent unreliability and the effect
of hypnosis in eliminating any meaningful cross-examination on those
matters. ' 269 After Rock was subsequently convicted, she appealed, with the
Supreme Court of Arkansas eventually affirming after deciding "to follow
the approach of States that ha[d] held hypnotically refreshed testimony of
witnesses inadmissible per se."27°
In its reversal, the United States Supreme Court began, as it had in
Washington v. Texas, by tracing the common law patchwork of rules
rendering certain categories of individuals incompetent to testify at trial to
27their near death to United States v. Rosen.27i Of course, Rosen merely
struck down the doctrine of disqualification for infamy on nonconstitutional
grounds, 272 but the Court in Washington v. Texas significantly expanded
that decision and struck the fatal blow to the common law rule precluding
certain categories of witnesses from testifying to their near death,
concluding that "arbitrary rules that prevent whole categories of defense
witnesses from testifying" violate the right to present a defense. 73 The
Court now concluded that "[j]ust as a State may not apply an arbitrary rule
of competence to exclude a material defense witness from taking the stand,
it also may not apply a rule of evidence that permits a witness to take the
stand, but arbitrarily excludes material portions of his testimony.'
274
The Court then attempted to define exactly what it meant by an arbitrary
2661Id. at 47.
267id.
268 id.
269Id. at 47-48 n.3.
270Id. at 48-49.
271Id. at 54 (quoting Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467, 471-72 (1918)); see generally
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 20-33 (1967).
27 Rock, 483 U.S. at 54.
273 Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 22 (1967).
274Rock, 483 U.S. at 55.
2009]
HeinOnline  -- 61 Baylor L. Rev. 909 2009
BA YLOR LAW REVIEW
application of a rule of evidence.275 It found that "restrictions of a
defendant's right to testify may not be arbitrary or disproportionate to the
purposes they are designed to serve. 276 In other words, "[i]n applying its
evidentiary rules a State must evaluate whether the interests served by a rule
justify the limitation imposed on the defendant's constitutional right to
testify., 277  Under these principles, Arkansas' per se anti-hypnosis rule
could not withstand scrutiny because it "operate[d] to the detriment of any
defendant who undergoes hypnosis, without regard to the reasons for it, the
circumstances under which it took place, or any independent verification of
the information it produced., 278 Put another way, "[a] State's legitimate
interest in barring unreliable evidence does not extend to per se exclusions
that may be reliable in an individual case. 2 79
The problem with Arkansas' rule on the one hand was that "[i]t virtually
prevented [Rock] from describing any of the events that occurred on the day
of the shooting, despite corroboration of many of those events by other
witnesses. 280  Moreover, while the Court conceded that hypnosis can
introduce the possibility of unreliable recollections, 281 it found that "the
inaccuracies the [hypnosis] process introduces can be reduced, although
perhaps not eliminated, by the use of procedural safeguards," 282 which
Doctor Back apparently followed.283
7. United States v. Scheffer
In the wake of the Supreme Court's landmark ruling in Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.284 in 1993, several federal circuit courts
began suggesting that existing automatic bans on the admission of
polygraph evidence might no longer be constitutionally defensible.285 In the
275 See id. at 55-56.
2 76 
id.
27 7 1d. at 56.
2781d
2 79 1d. at 61.
280Id. at 57.
28 Id. at 59 (noting that hypnosis appears to increase both correct and incorrect recollections).
2 821d, at 60.
2831d. at 62.
284509 U.S. 579 (1993).
285Faust F. Rossi, Evidence, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV. 507, 526 (1999) (stating that in light of
Daubert several federal circuit courts have suggested that the automatic bans on polygraph
evidence should be re-examined).
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United Stated Supreme Court's 1998 opinion, United States v. Scheffer,
however, it forestalled this line of analysis by rejecting the argument that
Rock compelled a finding that the per se exclusion of polygraph evidence
violated a criminal defendant's right to present a defense.286
In Scheffer, Air Force airman Edward Scheffer volunteered in March
1992 to work as an informant on drug investigations, which rendered him
subject to drug testing and polygraph examinations.287 Soon after taking a
drug test that April, but before the results were known, Scheffer agreed to
take a polygraph test, which "indicated no deception" when he denied using
drugs since enlisting.288 If Scheffer was lying, the drug test was not, as it
revealed the presence of methamphetamine.
289
During his ensuing court-martial on charges of methamphetamine use,
Scheffer raised an "innocent ingestion" theory,290 but the military judge
precluded him from introducing the polygraph evidence in support of this
claim pursuant to Military Rule of Evidence 707, which stated in relevant
part: "(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the results of a
polygraph examination, the opinion of a polygraph examiner, or any
reference to an offer to take, failure to take, or taking of a polygraph
examination shall not be admitted into evidence. 29'
After Scheffer was convicted, he appealed to the Air Force Court of
Criminal Appeals, which affirmed, explaining that Rule 707 "does not
arbitrarily limit the accused's ability to present reliable evidence., 292 But
the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces reversed, concluding that "'[a]
per se exclusion of polygraph evidence offered by an accused to rebut an
attack on his credibility.., violates his Sixth Amendment right to present a
defense."
293
In reversing the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court, in an opinion
written by Justice Thomas, began by couching the new Rock test in the
negative: "Such rules [of evidence] do not abridge an accused's right to
present a defense so long as they are not 'arbitrary' or 'disproportionate to
286523 U.S. 303, 307-08 (1998).
287 Id. at 305.
28 1Id. at 306.
2 8 9
id,
290id.
29 11d. at 306-07 (quoting MILITARY R. EvID. 707).
292 United States v. Scheffer, 41 M.J. 683, 691 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1995).
293 United States v. Scheffer, 44 M.J. 442, 445 (C.A.A.F. 1996).
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the purposes they are designed to serve."' 2 94 Justice Thomas then added a
clarification to this test, deducing from Rock, Chambers v. Mississippi, and
Washington v. Texas that "the exclusion of evidence [can] be
unconstitutionally arbitrary or disproportionate only where it has infringed
upon a weighty interest of the accused.,
291
The Court then flagged three legitimate governmental interests that Rule
707 rationally and proportionally advanced,296 but a majority of the Justices
only signed the part of the opinion dealing with the first interest.297 That
interest was the government's "legitimate interest in ensuring that reliable
evidence is presented to the trier of fact in a criminal trial. 298 According to
a majority of the Court, the problem with Scheffer's argument was that
there was "simply no consensus that polygraph evidence is reliable.,
299
Moreover, according to Justice Thomas, unlike in Rock, "there is simply no
way to know in a particular case whether a polygraph examiner's
conclusion is accurate, because certain doubts and uncertainties plague even
the best polygraph exams., 30 0 This impossibility of reliability thus rendered
Rule 707's per se exclusion of all polygraph evidence "a rational and
proportional means of advancing the legitimate interest in barring unreliable
evidence."'3°
Justice Thomas also proffered the preservation of the jury's role as lie
detector and the avoidance of litigation collateral to the primary purpose of
the trial as legitimate interests rationally and proportionally advanced by
Rule 707's categorical exclusion,0 2 but he could only coax the signatures of
Rehnquist, Scalia, and Souter on these parts of the opinion. 30 3 But Thomas
did corral an eight Justice majority in support of his conclusion that the
military judge did not violate Scheffer's right to present a defense because
Rule 707 does not implicate a sufficiently weighty interest of the
294United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998) (quoting Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S.
44, 56 (1987)).
295ld"
296Id. at 309.
297
Id. at 318.
2981d. at 309.
299id.
3
°°Id. at 312.
3 0 1
1d.
302See id. at 312-15.
3031d. at 305.
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accused.3 °4 The Court briefly recounted the facts of Rock, Washington v.
Texas, and Chambers v. Mississippi, but concluded that "unlike the
evidentiary rules at issue in those cases, Rule 707 does not implicate any
significant interest of the accused., 30 5 In Rock, the court precluded the
testimony of the only witness with "firsthand knowledge of the facts., 30 6 In
Washington v. Texas, the Texas statutes prevented a witness from testifying
regarding "events that he had personally observed., 307  In Chambers v.
Mississippi, the trial court "excluded the testimony of three persons to
whom that witness had confessed., 30 8  Conversely, despite the court-
martial's exclusion of the polygraph evidence under Rule 707, the court
members during Scheffer's trial "heard all the relevant details of the
charged offense from the perspective of the accused, and the Rule did not
preclude him from introducing any factual evidence., 30 9 Rule 707 merely
barred Scheffer "from introducing expert opinion testimony to bolster his
own credibility.,
310
8. Holmes v. South Carolina
The Supreme Court's 2006 opinion in Holmes v. South Carolina,
contains its most recent assessment of a defendant's right to present a
defense.31 In Holmes, Bobby Lee Holmes was sentenced to die after being
convicted of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, first-degree burglary, and
robbery in connection with the death of eighty-six-year-old Mary
Stewart.31 2 In securing Holmes' conviction, the prosecution relied heavily
on forensic evidence, such as evidence that Holmes' underwear contained a
mixture of DNA from two individuals, with ninety-nine point nine percent
of the population other than Stewart and Holmes having been excluded as
contributors to that mixture.
313
3
"See id. at 304, 308, 316-17.
305 1d. at 316-17.
306Id. at 315.
307Id. at 316.
3 0 8 id.
3 0 9 Id. at 317.
310 Id.
3 1
'See generally 547 U.S. 319, 321-22 (2006); see also Stull v. Campbell, No. CIV S-05-
1762 JAM KJM P, 2009 WL 172983, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2009).
3 12Holmes, 547 U.S. at 321-22.
3 13 Id. at 322.
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In response, Holmes "sought to introduce proof that another man,
Jimmy McCaw White, had attacked Stewart" on the day of her death.
314
The trial court, however, precluded Holmes from presenting evidence
concerning this alternate suspect theory, and the Supreme Court of South
Carolina subsequently affirmed this evidentiary ruling and Holmes'
conviction. 315 The court concluded that "where there is strong evidence of
an appellant's guilt, especially where there is strong forensic evidence, the
proffered evidence about a third party's alleged guilt does not raise a
reasonable inference as to the appellant's own innocence."
316
In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Alito, the United States
Supreme Court reversed, finding that the rule applied by the Supreme Court
of South Carolina violated Holmes' right to present a defense.
317
Incorporating the last refinement of that right by Justice Thomas in
Scheffer,318 Justice Alito indicated that "[t]his right is abridged by evidence
rules that infring[e] upon a weighty interest of the accused and are arbitrary
or disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve., 31 9 Alito
then noted how each of the aforementioned opinions (sans Scheffer)
addressed arbitrary rules, such as the Texas statutes in Washington v. Texas,
which "could not even be defended on the ground that [they] rationally set[]
apart a group of persons particularly likely to commit perjury since the
rule[s] allowed an alleged participant to testify if he or she had been
acquitted or was called by the prosecution."
320
The Court noted that notwithstanding this right, judges can exclude
evidence that is "repetitive" or "only marginally relevant," such as alternate
suspect evidence that merely casts "bare suspicion" on another or merely
raises "a conjectural inference" of his guilt.321 But it found that the
Supreme Court of South Carolina "radically changed and extended" this
principle in Holmes' case by focusing its critical inquiry on the strength of
the prosecution's case while remaining insouciant to the probative value of
3 141d. at 323.
"'Id. at 324.3161d. (construing State v. Gay, 541 S.E.2d 541 (S.C. 2001)).
3 171d. at 331.
318See supra note 295 and accompanying text.
319Holmes, 547 U.S. at 324-25 (quoting United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998)
(internal quotations omitted)).
320 Id. at 325 (quoting Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 22-23 (1967) (internal quotations
omitted)).
32 1Id. at 326, 328.
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the defendant's alternate suspect evidence or the "potential adverse effects
of [not] admitting the defense evidence of third-party guilt. '322 According
to Alito, the rule applied by the court was arbitrary and did not serve the
end that it was designed to promote because, "by evaluating the strength of
only one party's evidence, no logical conclusion can be reached regarding
the strength of contrary evidence offered by the other side to rebut or cast
doubt."3
23
B. Tests Used by Lower Courts in Applying the Right to Present a
Defense
These Supreme Court opinions gave the lower courts a "lack of
guidance" by failing to articulate any clear test for determining whether the
application of a rule of evidence violates criminal defendant's right to
present a defense.324 That said, in its 1982 opinion in United States v.
Valenzuela-Bernal, a Compulsory Process Clause appeal which did not
involve the application of a rule of evidence, the Court noted that in
Washington, it had found a violation of the Sixth Amendment "when the
defendant was arbitrarily deprived of 'testimony [that] would have been
relevant and material, and ... vital to the defense.' 325 From this language,
the Court concluded that Washington intimated that a criminal defendant
must "at least make some plausible showing" that the evidence he sought or
was seeking to introduce was or would have been "material and favorable to
his defense" to establish a Compulsory Process Clause violation.326 The
Court then found this intimation borne out by the line of cases stemming
from Brady v. Maryland, which it found indicated "that implicit in the
requirement of materiality is a concern that the suppressed evidence might
have affected the outcome of the trial. 327
From Valenzuela-Bernal and the aforementioned "right to present a
defense" line of opinions, lower courts have employed a remarkable variety
of tests, whether implicitly or explicitly, when applying the right to rules of
322 See id. at 328-29.
323 Id. at 331.
324 Hoeffel, supra note 180, at 1353.
325458 U.S. 858, 867 (1982) (quoting Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 16 (1967))
(emphasis in original).
326 1d.
3271d. at 868 (quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (internal citations
omitted)).
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evidence.328 While numerous, most of the tests are quite similar.329
According to the Third Circuit, a court violates a criminal defendant's right
to present a defense when its application of an evidentiary rule does three
things. 330  First, that the defendant was or would be deprived "of the
opportunity to present evidence in his favor;" second, the excluded
evidence was or would be "material and favorable to his defense;" and
third, the deprivation was or would be "arbitrary or disproportionate to any
legitimate evidentiary or procedural purpose. 331
Other courts have analyzed right to present a defense claims under a due
process analysis, with there being "little, if any, difference in th[is]
analysis" and the Third Circuit's test mentioned above.332 In essence, these
courts apply the same analysis under factors one and three and decide under
factor two whether the evidence at issue "creates a reasonable doubt that did
not otherwise exist. 3 3 3 Additionally, other courts have utilized a test that
also applies the same analysis under factors one and three; however, these
courts decide under factor two whether the evidence was or is "reliable,"
which they determine by considering basically the same factors that other
courts consider under factor two. 3 34 These factors mainly include the extent
to which the evidence at issue is or was: (1) corroborated 335 (based upon
Chambers v. Mississippi, Green, and Rock);33 6 (2) the sole evidence on an
issue or merely repetitive or cumulative337 (based on Washington v. Texas,
Crane, and Holmes);338 (3) probative of a central or critical issue339 (based
328Hoeffel, supra note 180, at 1353.
329See id. (noting that only the second elements of the tests vary).
33 0Gov't of the Virgin Islands v. Mills, 956 F.2d 443, 446 (3d Cir. 1992).
33 11d.
3321 Id. at 445 n.4.
333 Hoeffel, supra note 180, at 1353-54 (quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112
(1976)).
334Chia v. Cambra, 281 F.3d 1032, 1037 (9th Cir. 2002).
335 See Alley v. Bell, 307 F.3d 380, 395 (6th Cir. 2002) (noting that the Supreme Court has
made clear that the exclusion of critical, corroborative defense evidence may violate the right to
present a defense).
336See supra Part III.A.3-4, 6 and accompanying text.337See e.g., Jensen v. Romanowski, 564 F. Supp. 2d 740, 750 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (noting that
courts do not violate the right to present a defense by excluding evidence that is repetitive or
marginally relevant).
338 See supra Part III.A.2, 5, 8 and accompanying text.
339 See, e.g., Gov't of the Virgin Islands v. Mills, 956 F.2d 443, 447 (3d Cir. 1992).
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on Washington v. Texas, Chambers v. Mississippi, Green, and Crane ); 340
and (4) important to a weighty interest of the accused 341 (based on Scheffer
and Holmes). 34
2
C. Application of the Right to Present a Defense to Evidentiary
Privileges
In the terminal footnote of its opinion in Washington v. Texas, the
Supreme Court left open the question of how the right to present a defense
interacts with evidentiary privileges.343 The aforementioned Supreme Court
right to present a defense cases dealt with courts applying rules to exclude
evidence based upon perceived unreliability, and the appellants thus merely
had to establish that the excluded evidence was reliable to prove that the
rule as applied was arbitrary or disproportionate to the purpose that it was
designed to serve.344 The problem with extending this analysis to the
application of evidentiary privileges is that they "often exclude perfectly
reliable evidence to serve other societal goals. 345 Therefore, an appellant
cannot prove that the exclusion of evidence under a privilege violated his
right to present a defense simply by establishing that the excluded evidence
was reliable. 346 Consequently, courts have generally required appellants to
prove not only that evidence excluded under a privilege is reliable, but also
that their need for the evidence outweighs the interests protected by the
privilege.347  This analysis appears consistent with the Court's claim in
Rock that "[i]n applying its evidentiary rules a State must evaluate whether
the interests served by a rule justify the limitation imposed ....
The opinion of the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York in Morales v. Portuondo provides a nice illustration of this
34°See supra Part III.A.3-5 and accompanying text.
341See, e.g., United States v. Hoffecker, 530 F.3d 137, 184 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting that the
application of a rule of evidence is only arbitrary or disproportionate when it infringes upon a
weighty interest of the accused).
34 2 See supra Part III.A.7-8 and accompanying text.
343Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 23 n.21 (1967); see also GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE
882 (Robert C. Clark ed., 2d ed., Thomson Reuters/Foundation Press 2008) (2002).
344See FISHER, supra note 343, at 882 (recognizing that the "hearsay rule aims to exclude
unreliable evidence").
345 Id.
346Id.
347 See id.
348See supra notes 275-76 and accompanying text.
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type of analysis. 349 In Morales, Jose Morales filed a petition for writ of
habeas corpus that the Southern District of New York considered nearly
thirteen years after Ruben Montalvo and he were convicted of the murder of
Jose Antonio Rivera in 1988.350 Part of the basis for Morales' petition was
the testimony of attorney Stanley Cohen.35' Morales called Cohen as a
witness at the 2001 evidentiary hearing on his petition, and Cohen testified
that Jesus Fornes, who was killed in 1997, told him soon after Morales and
Rivera were convicted "that he and two other individuals had killed
someone and that the two individuals who had been convicted of the
murder had not been involved.,
352
Cohen was actually the fourth person to whom Fornes had confessed
back in 1988; he had made prior confessions to Morales' lawyer,
Montalvo's mother, and a priest.353 Despite Fornes' protestations to the
contrary, Cohen convinced him to invoke his Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination in the inevitable event that he was interrogated.354
Thereafter, as part of Morales' motion to set aside his murder conviction in
1989, Fornes was indeed questioned, and he followed Cohen's advice by
invoking his Fifth Amendment privilege. 355 After determining that Fornes'
confession to the priest was covered by the priest-penitent privilege, the
Appellate Division denied Morales' motion.
356
In considering Morales' subsequent petition for writ of habeas corpus in
2001, the district court actually found that Fornes' "confession" to the priest
was not privileged because, inter alia, it was a "heart-to-heart" talk rather
than a "formal confession. '" 357 But Fornes was no longer around to invoke
his Fifth Amendment privilege, and while Cohen was now willing to testify
concerning Fornes' confession to him, the court found that the confession
was covered by attorney-client privilege. 358 Notwithstanding its privilege
conclusion, the court found that "under the authority of Chambers v.
149 154 F. Supp. 2d 706 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
35 Id. at 709-10.
351 Id. at 719.
352 d. at 713.
3 5 3 1d. at 711-12.
3
"Id. at 714.
3551d.
3561d. at 717, 719.
3571d. at 729.
3581d. at 730.
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Mississippi ... Fornes's statements to Cohen [we]re admissible" 359 because:
Fornes spoke to Cohen to obtain legal advice, but he
was merely repeating what he had already told three other
people, including Morales's lawyer and Montalvo's
mother. Fornes wanted to continue to help Morales and
Montalvo, but Cohen advised him that he would probably
only hurt himself without helping Morales and Montalvo at
all. Fornes was undoubtedly speaking the truth when he
told Cohen that he had committed the murder and that
Morales and Montalvo were not present. Fornes has been
deceased for some four years now, while two apparently
innocent men have spent nearly thirteen years in prison for
a crime that he committed.360
The court thus found that "Morales was denied a trial in accord with
traditional and fundamental standards of due process" it thus granted his
habeas petition.
361
D. Application of the Right to Present a Defense to Juror Misconduct
As Green v. Georgia and Morales v. Portuondo make clear, courts have
not narrowly construed the "right to present a defense" as merely the right
to present a defense at the guilt phase of trial or even at any phase of the
initial trial.362 Instead, the right to present a defense is the right to present
evidence, whether at an initial trial, a direct appeal, or in support of a
motion for a new trial or petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Despite these
broad readings of the right, only one court has addressed the issue of
whether the exclusion of evidence regarding alleged jury misconduct can
violate the right to present a defense, and that court did so sua sponte,
without the petitioner even raising the argument.363  Significantly, the
court's opinion in that case was written by then Third Circuit Judge Alito,
the Supreme Court Justice with the current last word on the right to present
a defense, and it involved allegations of juror racism.364
359 1d.
360Id. at 731.
3611d. at 732.
362 See generally 442 U.S. 95 (1979); 154 F. Supp. 2d 706 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
363 Williams v. Price, 343 F.3d 223, 236 (3d Cir. 2003).
3641d. at 225.
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In Williams v. Price, Ronald A. Williams, an African-American, was
convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment in
connection with a fatal shooting outside a truck depot in Pennsylvania.365
Before the jurors that convicted Williams were seated, the trial court asked
them two questions: (1) "Do you personally believe that blacks as a group
are more likely to commit crimes of a violent nature involving firearms?"
and (2) "Can you listen to and judge the testimony of a black person in the
same fashion as the testimony of a white person, giving each its deserved
credibility? 3 66 Each juror selected to serve answered "no" to the first
question and "yes" to the second question.367
After Williams was convicted, he unsuccessfully filed a Post-Conviction
Relief Act ("PRCA") Petition, which contained two affidavits.3 68
According to the affidavit of Judith Montgomery, inter alia, "when I was
Juror No. 9... I was called 'a n[*****] lover' and other derogatory names
by other members of the jury. Remarks were made to me such as 'I hope
your daughter marries one of them."' 369  Williams also included the
affidavit of his "intimate acquaintance," Jewel Hayes. 370 In her affidavit,
Hayes stated:
Subsequent to the proceedings in this case. . . I ran into
Juror Number Two (2) in the lobby of the
Courthouse.... Upon seeing me he stated "All n[*******]
do is cause trouble[.]" I am not sure whether this was
stated directly to me but it was stated for my benefit and
loudly enough for me to hear and to get a rise out of me.
During our confrontation he also stated "I should go back
where I came from."3
71
The PRCA court denied Williams' petition, not mentioning Hayes'
affidavit, and finding with regard to Montgomery's affidavit that "it is
firmly established that after a verdict is recorded and the jury discharged, a
juror may not impeach the verdict by his or her own testimony."372
3 6 5 
id.
366Id. at 226.
3 6 7 
id.
3681Id. at 227.
3 6 9 
id.
3 7 0
Id. at 225.
3 7 1
1d. at 227.
3 7 2
id.
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Subsequently, after Williams' state superior court appeal was unsuccessful
and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied review, he filed a petition for
writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania. 37 3 That court denied the petition, finding that the
state courts' actions in precluding the admission of Montgomery's affidavit
were not contrary to Tanner and other Supreme Court opinions.374 And
while that court briefly mentioned Hayes' affidavit, it made no further
reference to Hayes in denying Williams' petition.375
Williams thereafter appealed to the Third Circuit, claiming, inter alia,
that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury.3 76 Alito
began by noting that the court's standard of review was governed by 28
U.S.C § 2254(d)(1), meaning that he could not award federal habeas relief
unless the PCRA court's decision was "contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 377 In this regard,
Williams' chance of success seemed dim.
But while Williams did not raise the right to present a defense himself,
Alito rounded up the usual suspects-Washington v. Texas, Chambers v.
Mississippi, Crane, Rock, and Scheffer-and concluded that "[n]one of
these cases clearly establishes just how far a jurisdiction may go in
excluding evidence of juror misconduct. 378 Alito, however, was able to
construe these opinions "as 'clearly establish[ing] ... that a state evidence
rule may not severely restrict a defendant's right to put on a defense if the
rule is entirely without any reasonable justification. 37 9
Understandably, Alito concluded that the state courts' exclusion of
Montgomery's affidavit during the inquiry into the validity of the verdict
neither contravened nor unreasonably applied clearly established Federal
law because, as noted, the vast majority of courts have held that Rule
606(b) precludes jurors from impeaching their verdicts through allegations
of racial, religious, or other bias.380 According to Alito, this was the only
3731d. at 228.
3741d.
3 7 5
1d.
3 7 6
1d.
377Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C § 2254(d)(1)) (emphasis in original).
37 1ld. at 231-32.
379Id. at 232.
380See Gold, supra note 13 at 127-28.
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basis of his conclusion. 38' He noted that the Third Circuit's role in Price
was "not to interpret Rule 606(b) or any other version of the 'no
impeachment' rule but merely to determine whether the state courts
contravened or unreasonably applied clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court."
382
Alito also noted that Williams claimed in his petition that the
Pennsylvania state courts improperly precluded him from introducing
Montgomery's affidavit to prove that jurors lied during voir dire.383 As
noted supra, "[c]ourts have universally held that provisions similar to [Rule
606(b)]... do not preclude evidence to show that a juror lied during voir
dire." 384 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court is not yet one of those courts,
and Alito thus found that the state courts neither contravened nor
unreasonably applied Federal law, especially in light of Tanner.385 Again,
Alito was quick to point out that the Third Circuit's opinion was solely
based upon this ground because the issue before it was "not whether
Montgomery's testimony was prohibited by Federal Rule 606(b) (since
Rule 606(b) did not govern the state proceedings) or by the Pennsylvania
version of the 'no impeachment' rule (since the enforcement of a state rule
is a matter for the state courts)." 386
Conversely, Alito found that "[n]o rational justification for the
exclusion of [Hayes' affidavit] was provided by the state courts or the
District Court, and none has been offered in this appeal. 387 Alito noted that
Mansfield's Rule, Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), and the similar
Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 606(b) all precluded jurors from
impeaching their verdicts after trial but that none of the three precluded
other sources from testifying regarding alleged juror misconduct.388 He
thus concluded that none of these three rules precluded the admission of
Hayes' affidavit because "[t]he incident that Hayes recounted occurred after
the trial ended and in a public place; no other jurors were alleged to have
been present at the time; and the offensive remarks did not concern
discussions among the jurors or anything that any other juror had
381 See generally Williams v. Price, 343 F.3d 223 (3d Cir. 2003).
382 Id. at 239.
383 See id. at 235.
384See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
3. Price, 343 F.3d at 235.
386
Id.
387 1d. at 233.
388 See id. at 232-33.
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purportedly said or done. 389
Therefore, according to the Supreme Court Justice with the current last
word on the right to present a defense, the exclusion of evidence concerning
racial bias by jurors can violate the right. The question then becomes
whether courts not bound by the limitations of a habeas review can
similarly find that the application of Rule 606(b) to preclude the admission
of post-trial juror testimony alleging racial, religious, or other bias during
trial violates that right.
IV. APPLYING THE RIGHT TO PRESENT A DEFENSE TO JUROR BIAS
A. Introduction
While the Supreme Court in Tanner found that the application of Rule
606(b) to preclude jury impeachment did not violate the petitioners' Sixth
Amendment right to a competent jury,39 ° the above analysis suggests that
convicted criminal defendants should be able to rely upon another Sixth
Amendment right to allow them to present juror testimony regarding racial,
religious, or other bias by jurors. Since Washington v. Texas, the Supreme
Court has declared that the Compulsory Process Clause renders unto
criminal defendants the right to present a defense, and courts have drawn
from Washington v. Texas and its progeny a three-factor analysis to
determine when that right is violated. When courts apply Rule 606(b) to
exclude juror testimony concerning juror racial, religious or other bias, they
implicate all three factors of this analysis.
B. Rule 606(b) Deprives Appellants of the Right to Present Evidence
of Juror Bias
Plainly, when courts apply Rule 606(b) to preclude jurors from
impeaching their verdicts based upon allegations of juror racial, religious,
or other bias, they deprive appellants from presenting evidence of juror
bias.39  Some courts hold that courts can only violate the right to present a
defense by applying per se rules of evidence to exclude appellants from
presenting evidence and not by excluding evidence under discretionary
389 Id. at 233.
39°Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 113-15, 126-27 (1987).
391See, e.g., supra note 160 and accompanying text.
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Rules, such as Rule 702.392 Because Rule 606(b) is a per se rule of
exclusion,393 even the courts reading the right to present a defense in this
manner would find that the Rule's application implicates the first factor of
the analysis.
C. The Excluded Evidence Is Material, Favorable, and Critical
As noted previously, in deciding whether the subject evidence
implicates the second factor, courts alternatively have considered whether
the evidence is material and favorable,394 critical,395 or "creates a reasonable
doubt that did not otherwise exist. 3 96 In essence, however, these courts all
consider basically the same factors,397 and all of these factors could or
necessarily would support a finding that evidence of juror racial, religious,
or other bias implicates the second factor of the analysis.
1. Allegations of Juror Bias Can Easily Be Corroborated
In Chambers v. Mississippi, the Court placed great emphasis on the fact
that three witnesses were ready to testify, and thus corroborate, McDonald's
sworn confession to the crime with which Chambers was charged.398
According to the Court, "[t]he sheer number of independent confessions
provided. . . corroboration .... ,,399  In a typical jury trial, as many as
eleven jurors can corroborate a juror's claim that a juror made biased
statements during trial.4°° Indeed, there have been cases where all twelve
jurors signed affidavits admitting to jury misconduct or
392See Moses v. Payne, 543 F.3d 1090, 1103 (9th Cir. 2008).
393 See, e.g., Robles v. Exxon Corp., 862 F.2d 1201, 1207 n.6 (5th Cir. 1989) ("[W]hether the
categorical rule created by rule 606(b) applies to a given case simply does not turn on whether
one, two, or all of the jurors indicate that they may have been confused or on when or how, after
they have rendered their verdict, the jurors evidence their confusion. Rather the application of
rule 606(b) is determined solely by the nature of the testimony sought to be introduced[] . .
394 Gov't of the Virgin Islands v. Mills, 956 F.2d 443, 446 (3d Cir. 1992).
39 5Chia v. Cambra, 281 F.3d 1032, 1037 (9th Cir. 2002).
396 United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 (1976).
397 See supra Part III.B. and accompanying text.
39 Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 284 (1973).
399 
id.
4
°°See Robles v. Exxon Corp., 862 F.2d 1201, 1207 (5th Cir. 1989) (noting that other courts
had looked at grounds that considered that "not all of the jurors.., indicated that they had
misunderstood their instructions ... ").
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misunderstanding.4 1 Moreover, "[b]ias or prejudice is such an elusive
condition of the mind that it is most difficult, if not impossible, to always
recognize its existence .... ,,402 As the Supreme Court of Kansas correctly
noted in 1874: "overt acts ... are accessible to the knowledge of all the
jurors; if one affirms misconduct, the remaining eleven can deny; one
cannot disturb the action of the twelve; it is useless to tamper with one, for
the eleven may be heard.
40 3
2. Juror Testimony Is Almost Always the Sole Evidence of Juror
Bias
In the vast majority of cases, juror testimony would be the sole evidence
that an appellant could present after trial to establish that jurors made biased
statements during trial.40 4  Usually, only jurors are privy to jury
deliberations, rendering juror testimony "the only available evidence.., to
establish racist juror misconduct. ' °S In rare cases, jurors conduct part of
the jury deliberation process while in the public eye, allowing bystanders to
observe or overhear juror misconduct.40 6 But, as Justice O'Connor noted in
Tanner, in those cases, Rule 606(b) does not apply to the bystander;
therefore, the bystander can impeach the jury's verdict after trial, and there
would be no need to apply the right to present a defense.40 7 In every other
case, juror testimony is the sole evidence of juror bias during trial.
401See Tanno v. S.S. President Madison Vessel, 830 F.2d 991, 993 (9th Cir. 1987); Mauch v.
Mfrs. Sales & Serv., Inc., 345 N.W.2d 338, 342-43 (N.D. 1984); Grenz v. Werre, 129 N.W.2d
681, 691 (N.D. 1964); see also Robles v. Exxon Corp., 862 F.2d at 1207 n.6 ("[W]hether the
categorical rule created by rule 606(b) applies to a given case simply does not turn on whether
one, two, or all of the jurors indicate that they may have been confused or on when or how, after
they have rendered their verdict, the jurors evidence their confusion.").
402Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 231 (1982) (quoting Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S.
183, 196 (1909)).
403 Perry v. Bailey, 12 Kan. 539, 542-43 (1874) (referencing the acceptance ofjuror affidavits
that stated that one of the jurors was drunk during deliberations).
404 Racist Juror Misconduct, supra note 13, at 1596.
405 
Id.
406See United States v. Taliaferro, 558 F.2d 724, 725-26 (4th Cir. 1977) (noting that the
jurors were sent to dine at a private club during deliberations, and were instructed that though they
could discuss the case during dinner, they were not permitted to discuss the case when any other
person was in the room).
4 0 7See Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 127 (1987).
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3. Evidence of Juror Bias Is Probative of a Central Issue
It is well established that the presence of a biased juror is a structural
defect not subject to a harmless error analysis and necessitates "a new trial
without a showing of actual prejudice. 40 8 Put another way, "even if only
one member of a jury harbors a material prejudice, the right to a trial by an
impartial jury is impaired., 40 9 And to put it even more simply, "[o]ne racist
juror would be enough" to require the reversal of a verdict. 410 Because the
presence of a bias juror can never constitute harmless error, evidence of
juror bias during trial is ipso facto probative of a central issue.411
4. Evidence of Juror Bias Is Important to a Weighty Interest of
the Accused
Justice Thomas found that the exclusion of the polygraph evidence in
Scheffer did not implicate a weighty or significant interest of the accused
because such evidence did not consist of the testimony of a person who
personally observed or had firsthand knowledge of a relevant event as was
the case in Rock v. Arkansas, Washington v. Texas, and Chambers v.
Mississippi.412 Based upon this language, some authorities have claimed
that courts implicate the weighty interest of an accused only by applying
rules of evidence to "bar[] the introduction of testimony based upon
personal or firsthand knowledge. 41 3 Under this reading, courts applying
Rule 606(b) to preclude jurors from impeaching their verdicts through
testimony regarding racial, religious, or other slurs that they personally
heard implicates a weighty interest of the accused because "[t]he jurors are
the persons who know what really happened., 41 4 Other courts apparently
read Justice Thomas' language from Scheffer as merely rephrasing the third
4 0 8Dyer v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 970, 973 n.2 (9th Cir. 1998).
409After Hour Welding, Inc. v. Laneil Mgmt. Co., 324 N.W.2d 686, 690 (Wis. 1982).
410United States v. Henley, 238 F.3d 1111, 1120 (9th Cir. 2001).
411 See, e.g., State v. Santiago, 715 A.2d 1, 20 (Conn. 1998) ("Allegations of racial bias on the
part of a juror are fundamentally different from other types of juror misconduct because such
conduct is, ipso facto, prejudicial.").
412See supra notes 294-308 and accompanying text.
413 Edward J. Imwinkelried, A Defense of the Right to Present Defense Expert Testimony: The
Flaws in the Plurality Opinion in United States v. Scheffer, 69 TENN. L. REV. 539, 546 (2002).
4 14See Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence, Advisory Committee's Note, 46
F.R.D. 161, 290-91 (1969).
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factor discussed previously in the article 415 and based upon the same
reasoning applied in that subsection, this application of Rule 606(b) also
implicates a weighty interest of the accused.4 16
5. Conclusion
All four of the factors lower courts have applied thus far point in favor
of post-trial juror testimony concerning juror bias during trial being
material and favorable or critical. Moreover, even if a court were to find
that one of these factors did not support such a finding, it is important to
note that not all of these factors were implicated in each of the
aforementioned Supreme Court right to present a defense opinions.4t 7 For
instance, in Chambers v. Mississippi, McDonald's confessions to his three
friends were not the sole evidence of those confessions because Chambers
was able to admit McDonald's sworn confession.418 Therefore, there is
compelling argument that post-trial juror testimony concerning juror bias
during trial is material and favorable or critical even if a court does not find
that one or more of these factors is present in a particular case.
D. The Application of the Rule Is Arbitrary or Disproportionate to
the Purposes It Is Designed to Serve
The aforementioned opinions in Washington v. Texas and Rock v.
Arkansas, both of which the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed in Holmes
v. South Carolina as addressing applications of rules of evidence that were
arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes that they were designed to
serve,419 set forth three ways in which the application of Rule 606(b) to
allegations of juror bias implicates the third factor of the right to present a
defense analysis.
415See Ferensic v. Birkett, 501 F.3d 469, 478 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding that the district court's
exclusion of expert testimony concerning the unreliability of eyewitness identifications implicated
a weighty interest of the accused).
416E.g., Gov't of the Virgin Islands v. Mills, 956 F.2d 443, 446 (3d Cir. 1992).
417 See supra notes 317-20 and accompanying text.
418410 U.S. 291,292 (1973).
419 See supra notes 319-21 and accompanying text.
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1. Arbitrary Rules that Prevent Whole Categories of Witnesses
from Testifying
In Washington v. Texas, the Supreme Court found that the right to
present a defense is violated "by arbitrary rules that prevent whole
categories of defense witnesses from testifying on the basis of a priori
categories that presume them unworthy of belief., 420 As previously noted,
there used to be a patchwork of rules rendering certain categories of
individuals incompetent to testify based upon presumed unreliability
despite the fact that they were "physically and mentally capable of
testifying. ' 21 These rules, however, eventually fell out of favor, and the
Supreme Court struck the fatal blow by finding in Washington v. Texas that
they violate a criminal defendant's right to present a defense.4 22
As Federal Rules of Evidence 601 now makes clear, these reliability-
based competency rules have been cleared from the books in criminal cases.
Rule 601 states in relevant part that "[e]very person is competent to be a
witness except as otherwise provided in these rules. 423  The Advisory
Committee Note to this Rule indicated that:
This general ground-clearing eliminates all grounds of
incompetency not specifically recognized in the succeeding
rules of this Article. Included among the grounds thus
abolished are religious belief, conviction of crime, and
connection with the litigation as a party or interested person
or spouse of a party or interested person. With the
exception of the so-called Dead Man's Acts, American
jurisdictions generally have ceased to recognize these
grounds.424
The only other Federal Rules of Evidence dealing with witness
competency are Rules 602 through 606 and 701 through 702, and of those,
only Rule 606(b) has anything to do with presumed unreliability. Federal
Rule of Evidence 602 states that lay witnesses must have personal
knowledge about a matter to testify about it at trial.425 Federal Rule of
420 See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
421 See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
422See supra notes 271-73 and accompanying text.
423 FED. R. EvID. 601.
424 Id. 601 advisory committee's note.
425 See id. 602.
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Evidence 603 requires witnesses to take an oath or affirmation indicating
that they will testify truthfully.426 Federal Rule of Evidence 604 requires an
interpreter to take an oath or affirmation in addition to being qualified as an
expert witness.42 7 Federal Rule of Evidence 701 and 702 set forth the
conditions that lay and expert witnesses must respectively satisfy to render
opinion testimony. 428 Finally, Federal Rule of Evidence 605 precludes
judges from testifying at trials over which they preside, and Federal Rule of
Evidence 606(a) precludes jurors from testifying during trials in which they
are seated.429
The first five Rules do not prevent whole categories of witnesses from
testifying; they merely set forth the conditions that lay and expert witnesses
must satisfy in order to testify. The latter two Rules do prevent whole
categories of witnesses from testifying, but they do not do so on the basis of
a priori categories that presume them unworthy of belief.430 Instead, they
do so to prevent judges and jurors from having an "involvement destructive
of [actual or perceived] impartiality. 'A3I In other words, the concern of
these Rules is that the testimony of these witnesses is trustworthy rather
than untrustworthy, or at least that it will be perceived as such by the party
against whom it is rendered.
As the Advisory Committee noted, for the most part, the only remaining
rules of evidence that preclude a category of witnesses from testifying on
the basis of an a priori categorization that presumes them untrustworthy of
belief are state Dead Man's Statutes. These statutes generally preclude
interested parties from testifying about any communication, transaction, or
promise made to them by a now deceased (or incapacitated) person when
the testimony would damage the interests of the decedent's estate.432 The
theory behind Dead Man's Statutes "is that the interested person has reason
to fabricate his testimony and the deceased/incapacitated person does not
have the ability to dispute the testimony and protect his estate from false
claims. 433 These statutes, however, are a dying breed. Most states have
426See id. 603.
427 See id. 604.
42 8See id. 701-02.
4298ee id. 605, 606(a).
430 See id.
431 See id. 605 advisory committee's note.
432 See Posting of Colin Miller to EvidenceProf Blog,
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/evidenceprof/2007/10/dead-mans-statu.html (Oct. 26, 2007).
4 3 3
id.
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repealed them which leaves them on the books in only a handful of states. 434
More importantly, these Dead Man's Statutes are only applicable in civil
trials.435
The one anomaly left standing after the purging of reliability-based
competency rules in criminal cases is Rule 606(b), a vestige of Lord
Mansfield's centuries-old conclusion that jurors could not impeach their
own verdicts, and thus themselves, because "a person testifying to his own
wrongdoing was, by definition, an unreliable witness., 4 36 On this ground
alone, courts could find that application of Rule 606(b) to allegations of
racial, religious, or other bias by jurors violates the right to present a
defense because it is an arbitrary rule that prevents a whole category of
witnesses-jurors-from impeaching their verdicts after trial on the basis of
an a priori categorization that presumes them unworthy of belief.
One potential problem with this argument is that Rule 606(b) prevents
jurors from impeaching their verdicts after trial based not only upon their
presumed unreliability, but also based upon the desire to promote the values
identified in McDonald: "freedom of deliberation, stability and finality of
verdicts, and protection of jurors against annoyance and embarrassment. 437
Perhaps, then, courts should treat Rule 606(b) more like a rule of privilege
than a rule of (in)competence, meaning that it is not governed by the
Washington v. Texas opinion, which excepted privileges from its
analysis.438 Instead, courts would engage in a Morales analysis and, as will
be noted infra, determine whether a criminal defendant's need for juror
testimony concerning allegations of bias outweighs the values promoted by
Rule 606(b).439
Treating Rule 606(b) in this manner makes a certain amount of sense
because, despite the fact that the Advisory Committee made clear that Rule
606(b) is a witness competency rule,440 some courts have either specifically
referred to the Rule as a rule of privilege441 or evaluated it under a
434Wesley P. Page, Dead Man Talking: A Historical Analysis of West Virginia's Dead Man's
Statute and a Recommendation for Reform, 109 W. VA. L. REV. 897, 898 (2007).
435 Fullerton Lumber Co. v. Korth, 127 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Wis. 1964).
436 See generally Christman supra note 43.
437 FED. R. EvID. 606(b) advisory committee's note.
438 Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 23 n.21 (1967).
439 See infra note 466 and accompanying text.
440 See FED. R. EvID. 606(b) advisory committee's note.
"'Gold, supra note 13, at 135 & n.43 (construing Bays v. Petan Co., 94 F.R.D. 587, 591 (D.
Nev. 1982)).
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"typical... privilege analysis. ' 4 2  But under further review, "[t]his
privilege analysis is an unconvincing explanation for the law of juror
incompetency ' 443 for two essential reasons. First, the holder of any
evidentiary privilege "may customarily waive it."4" Conversely, jurors can
never waive Rule 606(b) and testify concerning anything internal to the jury
deliberation process; even in cases where all twelve jurors have signed
affidavits proclaiming juror misconduct, courts have deemed the jury
impeachment impermissible.445 Second, if Rule 606(b) were indeed a rule
of privilege, it would preclude jurors from testifying regarding alleged juror
misconduct at any proceeding." 6 But, the Rule does not preclude jurors
from testifying regarding such misconduct at a proceeding concerning the
issue of whether jurors lied during voir dire.447
Moreover, the fact that the Supreme Court expanded Mansfield's Rule
from a rule focused solely on juror (un)reliability to one also concerned
with other goals does not distinguish it from the competency rules the Court
deemed unconstitutional in Washington v. Texas.4 8 As noted, one of these
rules precluded spouses from testifying against or in favor each other under
the doctrine of coverture. 449  Like Mansfield's Rule, this doctrine was
originally rooted in presumed unreliability, with a wife being unable to
testify in favor of "her husband because her interests were thought to be
identical to his, and no witnesses could testify on his or her behalf due to
the disqualification of interest. '45 ° And, as with Mansfield's Rule, courts
eventually expanded the list of goals promoted by the spousal
incompetency doctrine to include protection of "the sanctity of marital
relations" and "hid[ing] from public gaze the sacred confidences which
4 21d. at 135 & n.44 (construing In re Beverly Hills Fire, 695 F.2d 207, 213 (6th Cir. 1982)).
443 1d. at 135.
44 1d.
445See Tanno v. S.S. President Madison Vessel, 830 F.2d 991, 993 (9th Cir. 1987); Mauch v.
Mfrs. Sales & Serv., Inc., 345 N.W.2d 338, 342-43 (N.D. 1984); Grenz v. Werre, 129 N.W.2d
681, 691 (N.D. 1964); see also Robles v. Exxon Corp., 862 F.2d 1201, 1207 n.6 (5th Cir. 1989).
4 6 See Gold, supra note 13, at 135.
447United States v. Henley, 238 F.3d 111, 1121 (9th Cir. 2001); Tobias v. Smith, 468 F.
Supp. 1287, 1289 (W.D.N.Y. 1979).
448See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 23 (1967).
449See Nesson supra note 198 and accompanying text.450Jonathan L. Hafetz, "'A Man's Home is His Castle? ": Reflections on the Home, the
Family, and Privacy During the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries, 8 WM. &
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 175, 193 (2002).
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subsist between husband and wife. 451  Viewed from this perspective, it
appears that Rule 606(b) comfortably fits within the patchwork of witness
competency rules that the Supreme Court deemed violative of a criminal
defendant's right to present a defense in Washington v. Texas.452
Under this reasoning, one could argue that, just as courts and
legislatures transformed the spousal incompetency rule into two waiveable
spousal evidentiary privileges, 453 they should change Rule 606(b) into a
waiveable evidentiary privilege, which would allow jurors to choose to
impeach their verdicts through allegations of juror bias. Indeed, some
scholars have suggested such a transformation, arguing that Rule 606(b)'s
"attempt to effectuate significant policy considerations affecting vital
substantive rights by rules of competency is like trying to eat soup with a
fork. Although by proper manipulation some nourishment can be supplied,
the process is hit or miss with substantial and unacceptable side effects. 454
While this argument has some appeal, it seems unlikely that courts or
legislatures would make such a radical change to a rule that has, for the
most part, been treated as a competency rule since 1785.
A similar inertia could prove fatal to the argument that application of
Rule 606(b) to allegations of juror bias violates the right to present a
defense. Critics could claim that this argument would create a slippery
slope. If courts treat Rule 606(b) as a reliability-based competency rule, it
might necessitate a finding that application of Rule 606(b) in any criminal
case would violate the right to present a defense, a conclusion that courts
would likely not be willing to accept. One response to this claim is that
criminal defendants asserting that courts applying Rule 606(b) to preclude
jury impeachment on grounds other than juror bias would have to prove that
the misconduct at issue was not merely harmless error and thus might have
difficulty establishing materiality under factor two. 4 55 A second response is
that a conclusion that application of Rule 606(b) violates the right to present
a defense in all criminal cases is not as outlandish as it may first appear. In
fact, it is the exact conclusion that the Supreme Court drew in McDonald,
451 Id.
452See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. at 23.
453 See G. Michael Fenner, Privileges, Hearsay, and Other Matters, 30 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 791, 800 (1997) (noting that there are two waiveable spousal privileges).
454Peter N. Thompson, Challenges to the Decisionmaking Process-Federal Rule of Evidence
606(b) and the Constitutional Right to a Fair Trial, 38 SW. L.J. 1187, 1221-22 (1985).455Cf United States v. Klein, 93 F.3d 698, 702-03 (10th Cir. 1996) (finding that the improper
submission of an unredacted indictment to the jury was harmless error).
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when it proclaimed that the anti-jury impeachment rule it adopted was
inapplicable in criminal cases and "limited to those instances in which a
private party seeks to use a juror as a witness to impeach the verdict., 456
2. Rules that Do Not Rationally Set Apart a Group of Persons
Particularly Likely to Commit Perjury
In Washington v. Texas, the Supreme Court concluded that even if the
Texas statutes before it were something other than improper competency
rules, they could not even be defended on the ground that they "rationally
set[] apart a group of persons who are particularly likely to commit
pejury. 457 As noted, while these statutes precluded a charged or convicted
coparticipant from providing exculpatory testimony in favor of his alleged
partner in crime, they (1) removed this proscription if the coparticipant was
exonerated and (2) never precluded such a coparticpant from providing
incriminatory testimony as a witness for the prosecution.458 In other words,
the statutes precluded coparticipants from testifying for certain purposes
and under certain circumstances but permitted them to testify for different
purposes and under different circumstances.
The same can be said about Rule 606(b). Courts repeatedly have held
that the Rule precludes jurors from impeaching their verdicts based upon
allegations of racial, religious, or other bias.459 Conversely, as noted in the
introduction, when "a juror has been asked direct questions about racial bias
during voir dire, and has sworn that racial bias would play no part in his
deliberations, evidence of that juror's alleged racial bias is indisputably
admissible for the purpose of determining whether the juror's responses
were truthful. 46°
For instance, in Tobias v. Smith, Archie Tobias, an African-American
man, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the United States
District Court for the Western District of New York after he was convicted
of second degree burglary and related charges. 461 The basis for Tobias'
petition was that the New York state courts improperly precluded him from
presenting a juror's affidavit alleging racist comments by jurors during trial
456 McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 269 (1915).
45 Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. at 22.
4581d. at 17 n,4.
459 See Gold, supra note 13, at 128.
460 See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
461468 F. Supp. 1287, 1287-88 (W.D.N.Y. 1979).
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to prove that jurors lied on voir dire.4 62 During voir dire in Tobias's trial,
all seated jurors indicated that they "had no prejudice toward black people
or toward the petitioner. ' '463 But according to the juror's affidavit, a "juror
said that we should take the word of two white victims as opposed to this
black defendant," and "[a]lthough the issue of identification was argued
vigorously, particularly the fact that the witnesses could not identify a photo
of the defendant, the jury foreman told everybody that it didn't matter
because '[y]ou can't tell one black from another. They all look alike. A64
The court agreed with Tobias and ordered a hearing on the question of
jury prejudice, finding that "where comments indicate prejudice or
preconceived notions of guilt, statements may be admissible not under
F.R.E. 606(b) but because they may prove that a juror lied during voir
dire. , , 65
Indeed, the Supreme Court of North Dakota ostensibly spoke accurately
when it issued its 2008 opinion in State v. Hidanovic, in which it found that
"[c]ourts have universally held that provisions similar to N.D.R.Ev.
606(b)... do not preclude evidence to show a juror lied during voir
dire. ' ' 66  Rule 606(b) does not preclude jurors from testifying regarding
juror misconduct under these circumstances because it "restricts inquiries
into the validity of a jury's verdict but it does not bar inquiries into whether
a juror lied or purposely withheld information during voir dire. 4 67 As with
the Texas statutes in Washington v. Texas, Rule 606(b) precludes jurors
from testifying for certain purposes and under certain circumstances-to
impeach a verdict when jurors have not been asked about bias on voir dire.
However, it allows them to testify for different purposes and under different
circumstances-to prove that jurors lied on voir dire when jurors have been
asked about bias on voir dire.468
In reality, though, the purposes are not meaningfully different because
inquiries into whether jurors lied on voir dire regarding racial, religious, or
462 Id. at 1289.
463Id.
464id
4651Id. at 1290-91.
466747 N.W.2d 463, 474 (N.D. 2008) (Seven months later, the Tenth Circuit found that
allegations of juror bias were admissible to prove that a juror lied during voir dire at a contempt
proceeding but not "to overturn the verdict."); United States v. Benally, 546 F.3d 1230, 1235
(10th Cir. 2008).
467Manrique v. State, 177 P.3d 1188, 1191 (Alaska. Ct. App. 2008).
468 See FED. R. EVID. 606(b).
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other bias necessarily become inquiries into the validity of a verdict. As the
Supreme Court held in McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood,
if an appellant can "demonstrate that a juror failed to answer honestly a
material question on voir dire, and then further show that a correct response
would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause," he is entitled
to a new trial. 469  Because "[diemonstrated bias in the responses to
questions on voir dire may result in a juror being excused for cause," an
inquiry into whether a juror lied during voir dire is an inquiry into the
validity of the verdict for all relevant intents and purposes, especially
because the presence of a biased juror is a structural defect.470
Consequently, when courts allow jurors to render post-trial testimony
concerning juror bias during deliberations to prove that a juror lied during
voir dire, the interests protected by Rule 606(b) are, for the most part,
implicated to the same extent that they would be if courts allowed jurors to
impeach their verdicts after trial through allegations of juror bias. If a court
allowed either type of testimony, jurors could be harassed by the losing
party, jurors could be embarrassed when their biased comments are exposed
in court, and the verdict would lose its finality if the appellant could prove
that a juror was biased.471 Furthermore, allowing jurors to impeach their
verdicts after trial through allegations of juror bias potentially causes less
violence to Rule 606(b)'s goal of precluding unreliable evidence than does
the current voir dire exception. In this former scenario, jurors might admit
to their biased statements after trial, and there would be no reason to
distrust their testimony because they never proclaimed impartiality during
voir dire. Meanwhile, under the status quo, a juror who claimed that bias
would not influence his decision is allowed to testify that bias did influence
his decision, rendering him, in Lord Mansfield's terms, "by definition, an
unreliable witness. 472
Application of Rule 606(b) to preclude appellants from presenting post-
trial juror allegations of juror bias thus does not serve any legitimate
evidentiary purpose and violates appellants' right to present a defense
unless it serves some legitimate procedural purpose.473 Advocates of the
status quo might argue that the current dichotomy serves a procedural
469464 U.S. 548, 556 (1984).
47 0See id. at 554.
47 1 See McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 268 (1915).
4 7 2 See Christman, supra note 43, at 815 n.78.
473 Gov't of the Virgin Islands v. Mills, 956 F.2d 443, 446 (3d Cir. 1992).
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purpose by, in effect, forcing criminal defendants to preserve their ability to
present post-trial juror allegations of juror bias by asking prospective jurors
about bias before trial. Under this analysis, such advocates could argue that
a criminal defendant must do everything to ensure that a biased juror is not
seated before he can challenge that juror's bias after trial.
The first response to this argument is that there is no reason that courts
should take it seriously until they take the idea of questioning prospective
jurors regarding racial, religious, and other bias before trial more seriously.
In its 1986 opinion Turner v. Murray, the Supreme Court did finally
announce that capital defendants accused of an interracial crime are
"entitled to have prospective jurors informed of the race of the victim and
questioned on the issue of racial bias., 474 But in every non-capital case, and
even in capital cases involving a defendant and victim of the same race,
defendants have no such automatic entitlement, meaning that "voir dire on
racial prejudice, generally is not available to the defendant. ' ' 75
Furthermore, it seems unlikely that courts would want to defend the
present dichotomy on procedural grounds when the necessary message such
an analysis would send is that all criminal defendants should operate under
the assumption that every prospective juror likely harbors a racial, religious,
or other bias. And indeed, because courts often "restrict the number.., of
questions that counsel may ask during voir dire," that is exactly the
assumption that most attorneys would have to make to place such bias
questions above other questions in the voir dire pecking order.476
Moreover, requiring criminal defendants to inquire into the biases of
prospective jurors would be fundamentally unfair because such questions
could easily inject race into trial as a primary issue and alienate jurors who
might feel implicitly accused of harboring said bias.477
Accordingly, Rule 606(b) serves no legitimate evidentiary or procedural
purpose by precluding jurors from testifying for certain purposes and under
474476 U.S. 28, 36-37 (1986).
475 Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Language and Culture (Not to Say Race) of Peremptory
Challenges, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 21, 46 (1993).
4 76 The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Leading Cases, 106 HARV. L. REV. 163, 247 (1992)
[hereinafter Leading Cases].
4 7 7See Butler v. Hosking, No. 93-5976, 1995 WL 73132, at *9 (6th Cir. 1995) ("[Clounsel
may have wished to avoid implicitly accusing potential jurors of racism or expressly injecting race
into the trial as a primary issue."); Leading Cases, supra note 476, at 247 ("A lawyer cannot
easily inquire into a potential juror's biases without insulting or alienating that person, onlooking
jurors or prospective jurors.").
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certain circumstances but allowing them to testify for technically different
purposes and under different circumstances. Therefore, Washington v.
Texas provides a second reason that the application of Rule 606(b) to post-
trial allegations of bias by jurors during trial violates the right to present a
defense.478
Critics might again claim that this reasoning would necessitate the
conclusion that the application of Rule 606(b) in any criminal case violates
the right to present a defense. The responses to this argument are similar to
the responses in the previous section. First, whereas the inclusion of a
biased juror is a structural defect necessitating a new trial,479 the inclusion
of an incompetent juror, such as a juror who cannot read and write English,
does not require reversal of a conviction unless there is a showing of actual
prejudice. 480  Thus, a criminal defendant would have to prove that the
seating of a drunk or sleepy juror was not merely harmless error and might
have difficulty establishing materiality under factor two. 48 1  Second, as
previously noted, a conclusion that application of Rule 606(b) violates the
right to present a defense in all criminal cases is consistent with the
Supreme Court's conclusion in McDonald and thus not necessarily
something that courts should reject out of hand.482
3. Rules that Per Se Exclude Unreliable Evidence that May Be
Reliable in an Individual Case
In Rock v. Arkansas, the Supreme Court found that Arkansas'
categorical exclusion of hypnotically refreshed testimony violated Rock's
right to present a defense because "[a] State's legitimate interest in barring
unreliable evidence does not extend to per se exclusions that may be
reliable in an individual case. 483 Assuming that courts treat Rule 606(b)
more like a rule of privilege than a rule of competence, they could find that
application of the rule to allegations racial, religious, or other bias violates
the right to present a defense because such allegations may be reliable in
individual cases. Of course, if courts treat Rule 606(b) like a rule of
privilege, appellants would also need to establish that their need for such
478 See generally 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
479Dyer v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 970, 973 n.2 (9th Cir. 1998).
480See, e.g., United States v. Silverman, 449 F.2d 1341, 1344 (2d Cir. 1971).
481 See id.
482 See McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 269 (1915).
483483 U.S. 44, 61 (1987).
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evidence outweighs the interests protected by the Rule.484
Initially, there is a strong argument that courts already have found that
the scales of justice tip in the favor of appellants in such cases without
realizing it. As noted previously, courts universally have found that jurors
may testify after trial regarding juror deliberations to prove that a juror lied
during voir dire. In so doing, most courts simply note that Rule 606(b) is
inapplicable in such situations, but a few courts have made clear what is
implicit in these opinions: these courts are concluding that appellants' need
for this evidence outweighs the interests protected by Rule 606(b). To wit,
in Levinger v. Mercy Medical Center, Nampa, the Supreme Court of Idaho
"ma[d]e clear that I.R.E. 606(b) does not bar the introduction of juror
affidavits revealing dishonesty during voir dire."485 In the accompanying
footnote, the court indicated that it was reaching this conclusion "not
unmindful of the policy goals underlying I.R.E. 606(b), namely, to promote
finality, protect jurors from post-trial inquiry or harassment, and to avoid
the practical concern that an affidavit by a juror to impeach the verdict is
potentially unreliable. 486  Because the appellant's need for evidence of
juror bias is not altered by the presence or absence of questions concerning
juror bias duding voir dire, courts should be able to find that the scales of
justice tip in favor of the appellant in jury impeachment cases based upon
analogy to voir dire exception cases.
If, however, courts do not accept this analogy, an appellant would first
have to demonstrate that a juror's allegations of juror bias are reliable in his
individual case. As previously noted, in accordance with Chambers v.
Mississippi, an appellant could establish such reliability by having as many
as eleven other jurors corroborate those allegations.487 Also, as in
Chambers v. Mississippi, opposing counsel would be able to cross-examine
the juror regarding his allegations and thus test his reliability. 488 Finally,
just as the Court in Chambers v. Mississippi found that McDonald's
484See supra note 325 and accompanying text.
48575 P.3d 1202, 1207 (Idaho 2003).
486 1d. at 1207 n.3.
487See Tanno v. S.S. President Madison Vessel, 830 F.2d 991, 993 (9th Cir. 1987); Mauch v.
Mfrs. Sales & Serv., Inc., 345 N.W.2d 338, 342-43 (N.D. 1984); Grenz v. Werre, 129 N.W.2d
681, 692 (N.D. 1964); see also Robles v. Exxon Corp., 862 F.2d 1201, 1207 n.6 (5th Cir. 1989)
("[W]hether the categorical rule created by rule 606(b) applies to a given case simply does not
turn on whether one, two, or all of the jurors indicate that they may have been confused or on
when or how, after they have rendered their verdict, the jurors evidence their confusion.").
48 Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 301 (1973).
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confessions were reliable as statements against penal interest, many courts
have found that statements of bigotry are reliable reflections of the
declarant's bias because they "would tend to subject the declarant to hatred,
ridicule, or disgrace such that a reasonable person would not make the
statement unless the person believed it to be true. '"
89
The question then becomes how an appellant can demonstrate that his
evidentiary need for post-trial jury testimony concerning juror bias
outweighs the interests protected by Rule 606(b) when the Supreme Court
in Tanner held that the application of Rule 606(b) does not violate the right
to a competent jury. 4 90 The answer is that the American judicial system is
much more concerned with the right to an impartial jury than it is with the
right to a competent jury. As noted, the inclusion of an incompetent juror,
such as a juror who cannot read and write English, does not require reversal
of a conviction unless there is a showing of actual prejudice.491 Conversely,
the inclusion of a biased juror is a "structural defect not subject to harmless
error analysis" necessitating "a new trial without a showing of actual
prejudice." 92
The reason for this difference is two-fold. First, the Supreme Court has
concluded that one of "[t]he purpose[s] of the jury is to guard against
the... biased response of a judge' 493 and that "[p]roviding an accused with
the right to be tried by a jury of his peers g[ives] him an inestimable
safeguard against the ... biased, or eccentric judge. ' 9 4 Second, the Court
has found that "[t]he right to an impartial jury lies at the heart of due
process. 4 95  In turn, "[a]llegations of racial bias on the part of jury
members strike at the heart of that right., 496 These additional interests
could tip the scales of justice in favor of the appellant when there are
allegations of juror bias even though those scales tip against him when there
are allegations of juror incompetence.
The more important point, however, is that the fact that the presence of
a biased juror is a structural defect not subject to a harmless error analysis
means that allegations of juror bias can be treated the same as allegations of
489 Chaddock v. State, 203 S.W.3d 916, 927-28 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.).
490See Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 127 (1987).
491 United States v. Silverman, 449 F.2d 1341, 1344 (2d Cir. 1971).
49 2 Dyer v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 970, 973 n.2 (9th Cir. 1998).
493 Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975).
494 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
491 Porter v. Illinois, 479 U.S. 898, 900 (1986).
496State v. Phillips, 927 A.2d 931, 933 (Conn. App. Ct. 2007).
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a clerical error by a jury. As previously noted, in 2006 Congress added a
third exception to Rule 606(b), allowing jurors to impeach their verdicts
after trial through testimony regarding "whether there was a mistake in
entering the verdict onto the verdict form,, 497 but still precluding them from
alleging that "the jury misunderstood or misapplied an instruction" because
such testimony "goes to the juror's mental processes underlying the
verdict., 498 This dichotomy explains the holding in Tanner because if the
jurors in that case had testified, the court thereafter would have needed to
inquire into the effect of their alcohol use, drug use, and drowsiness on their
mental processes in reaching the verdict.
Conversely, when a juror claims after trial that another juror made
biased comments during deliberations, the court does not need to inquire
into the mental processes underlying the verdict. This point is made clear
by an opinion from Connecticut, a state that allows jurors to impeach their
verdicts through allegations of juror bias. In State v. Phillips, jurors were
allowed to impeach their verdict convicting an African-American defendant
of third degree robbery and related charges through allegations of a juror's
racist comments. 499 During the jurors' testimony, the trial court asked the
jurors whether anything improper influenced their verdict.500 On appeal,
however, the Appellate Court of Connecticut concluded that the trial court:
should not[] have asked jurors whether anything improper
had influenced their verdict. It should have instead
restricted its inquiry to objective evidence of racially
related statements and behavior. The court should then
have decided whether that evidence amounted to racial bias
against the defendant on the part of one or more jurors,
which would have automatically warranted a new trial. 50'
In other words, if courts allowed jurors to render post-trial testimony
concerning racial, religious, or other slurs used by a juror during trial, they
would not need to inquire into the mental processes underlying the verdict.
Indeed, they would not even need to inquire into the verdict itself. They
would solely need to consider whether the juror made the alleged slurs and
whether those slurs evinced bias because the inclusion of a biased juror is a
497 FED. R. EvrD. 606(b)(3).
498Id. 606(b) advisory committee's note.
491927 A.2d at 937-38, 940.
5
°°Id at 937-38.
501Id.
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"structural defect not subject to harmless error analysis" necessitating "a
new trial without a showing of actual prejudice. 50 2
Clearly, by adopting the third exception to Rule 606(b) in 2006,
Congress concluded that appellants' need for evidence of juror clerical
errors outweighs the interests protected by the Rule because the
introduction of such evidence does not require courts to inquire into the
mental processes underlying the verdict. Using the same logic, courts
should find that the application of Rule 606(b) to allegations of juror bias
during trial violates the right to present a defense because the admission of
juror testimony regarding juror bias would not require courts to inquire into
the mental processes underlying the verdict.
If courts refuse to make such a finding, it begs the question of what type
of application of Rule 606(b) would violate the right to present a defense.
While most courts have found that Rule 606(b) precludes jurors from
impeaching their verdicts through allegations of bias, many courts still
agree that "allegations of racial bias on the part of a juror are fundamentally
different from other types of juror misconduct because such conduct is, ipso
facto, prejudicial. 50 3
Perhaps the answer is that courts would never find that an application of
Rule 606(b) violates the right to present a defense. But to do so, they would
have to make a compelling argument that Rule 606(b) is not only
essentially a rule of privilege, but also more sacrosanct than any other
evidentiary privilege. Rule 606(b) has exceptions, just as "all
privileges.., are subject to multiple exceptions. 50 4 As noted previously,
however, Rule 606(b) is not waiveable whereas the holder of every
evidentiary privilege can waive it.50 5 Moreover, courts have found that
every evidentiary privilege violates the right to present a defense when
applied in certain situations.50 6 Given these facts, it is difficult to see how
courts could hold that no application of Rule 606(b) violates the right to
present a defense unless they not only treat Rule 606(b) as an evidentiary
privilege but also find it significantly stronger than any other privilege. To
this point, no court has made such an argument.
502 Dyer v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 970, 973 n.2 (9th Cir. 1998).
503 State v. Santiago, 715 A.2d 1, 20 (Conn. 1998).
5
04 Eileen A. Scallen, Relational and Informational Privileges and the Case of the Mysterious
Mediation Privilege, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 537, 541 (2004).
505See Gold, supra note 13, at 135.
5
o6 FISHER, supra note 343, at 883-84.
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IV. CONCLUSION
In McDonald, the Supreme Court "recognize[d] that it would not be safe
to lay down any inflexible [anti-jury impeachment] rule because there might
be instances in which such testimony of the juror could not be excluded
without 'violating the plainest principles of justice."' 507  But by strictly
adhering to the language of Rule 606(b) and concluding that any
constitutional challenge to the Rule is foreclosed by the Supreme Court's
opinion in Tanner, courts have thrown the Supreme Court's caution to the
wind. When courts preclude jurors from impeaching their verdicts through
allegations of juror racial, religious, or other bias, they violate one of the
plainest principles of justice: the right to an impartial jury. Because the
fight to an impartial jury lies at the heart of due process, the presence of a
biased juror is a structural defect not subject to a harmless error analysis.
And yet, by applying Rule 606(b), an anomalous, reliability-based,
competency rule, courts preclude appellants from proving such bias, based
solely on the fact that their attorneys did not anticipate that their trials
would be resolved with reference to factors such as skin color or choice of
deity. Such an application of the Rule is thus arbitrary and disproportionate
to the purposes it was designed to serve and violative of the right to present
a defense.
507 McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 268-69 (1915) (quoting Mattox v. United States, 146
U.S. 140, 148 (1892)).
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